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INTRODUCTION
Jane is infertile. When she sought treatment for her condition, she
discovered that the health insurance provided through her work covered
some treatments, but excluded surgical impregnation procedures such as
the in vitro fertilization procedure recommended by her doctor. Jane’s
infertility is recognized as a disability under federal law, and all of the
excluded procedures are performed on women only.
Infertility affects approximately ten percent of the reproductive-age
population in the United States, and strikes people of every race, ethnicity
and socio-economic level.1 It is recognized by the medical community as a
————
1. See generally American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Frequently Asked
Questions About Infertility, at http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html (last visited Aug. 21,
2004) [hereinafter ASRM, Frequently Asked Questions]; See generally RESOLVE, The
National
Infertility
Association,
Coverage
for
Infertility,
available
at
http://www.resolve.org/main/national/advocacy/insurance/facts/coverage.jsp?name=advoca
cy &tag=insurance (last visited Apr. 9, 2005) [hereinafter RESOLVE, Coverage for
Infertility] (According to the National Center for Health Statistics, approximately 5.4
million couples experience infertility every year); Elizabeth Hervey Stephen & Anjani
Chandra, Use of Infertility Services in the United States: 1995, 32 FAM. PLANNING PERSP.
132 (May/June 2000) (surveyed population of fertility-impaired women similar to general
population of women in terms of education, income, race and ethnicity). But see U.S
CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES, OTABA-358 (Washington D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1988) available at
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.pr1/~ota/disk2/1988/8822/8822.PDF

disease, one with devastating physical, psychological, and financial
effects.2 Nonetheless, comprehensive coverage of infertility treatments
under employer-sponsored plans – where, like Jane, most Americans get
health insurance3 – appears to be the exception rather than the rule.4 Can
Jane sue for disability discrimination, sex discrimination, or both? While
the answer – “it depends” – should not be surprising to anyone who has
survived even a semester of law school, the facts upon which the answer
depends are increasingly surprising. Why is Jane infertile? If she went
ahead with the uncovered treatment, was it successful? Is Jane’s plan
insured or funded by her employer? When was the exclusion established?
Does the plan treat male infertility more frequently than female infertility?
And is Jane married? Underlying these factual and doctrinal issues is the
deeper question, should Jane be able to state a claim of discrimination? In
other words, why should the exclusion of treatments for infertility such as
in Jane’s plan be recognized as sex discrimination, disability
discrimination, or both? This Article seeks to explore these questions.
In the last few years, the federal courts have issued important decisions
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19645 (“Title VII”) including the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act,6 (“PDA”) and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 19907 (“ADA”) regarding insurance coverage of
treatments or conditions associated with sex and disability. Notably, the
Supreme Court held in the 1998 case Bragdon v. Abbott8 that reproduction
is a major life activity within the meaning of the ADA. Many lawyers,
activists and scholars thought that coverage for infertility treatment would

(noting that one and one-half times more married African-American women are infertile
than married white women) [hereinafter INFERTILITY].
2. See infra notes 14-33 and accompanying text.
3. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2001, available at
www.census.gov/hhes/hlthins/hlthin01/hlth01asc.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2004) (In 2001
62.6% of workers and their families were covered by employer-sponsored health plans.);
RUSSELL C. COILE, JR., FUTURESCAN, A FORECAST OF HEALTHCARE TRENDS 2002-2006 11
(2002) (“Employer-sponsored health insurance covers approximately 165 million, or 65
percent of working Americans.”).
4. Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine at 11-12,
Saks v. Franklin Covey, 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003), available at 2001 WL 34113555
(C.A.2) [hereinafter ASRM Amicus Brief]; see also Shorge Sato, A Little Bit Disabled:
Infertility and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 189,
197 (2001).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993).
8. 524 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1998)

follow soon after Bragdon.9 However, in 2003, in the first major case
applying Bragdon to health benefits, Saks v. Franklin Covey,10 the Second
Circuit held that an employer’s health plan could exclude coverage for
infertility procedures performed on women only without violating Title VII
or the ADA.
The decision in Saks was a disappointment to many, particularly after
the successful use of Title VII to challenge a health plan exclusion of
prescription contraceptives in Erickson v. Bartell Drug Company11 in 2001.
But Saks did not shut the door on using Title VII or the ADA to challenge
an employer’s exclusion of infertility treatment from its plan. Although the
ADA has received more scholarly attention in this context,12 the decisions
of the trial and appellate court illustrate the relative weakness of the ADA
as a tool to challenge discrimination in the content of employer health plans
because of its “equal access” test, which requires only facial neutrality, and
its broad “safe harbor” provision. The decisions also illustrate that Title
VII can offer significant advantages over the ADA for purposes of
challenging the exclusion of infertility treatment because a facially neutral
policy that simply permits equal access to the same set of benefits for male
and female employees is not sufficient. Instead, employers providing
coverage must provide equally comprehensive coverage for both sexes, and
the additional cost of offering non-discriminatory benefits, if any, is not a
defense. Although the court in Saks concluded that the employer’s plan
could lawfully exclude coverage for infertility procedures performed on
women only without violating Title VII or the ADA, this Article explains
how other courts could analyze claims under Title VII differently, and
provides a roadmap of alternative legal and factual analyses for Title VII
and ADA claims that could be successfully adopted in other cases.
————
9. See Jane Gross, The Fight to Cover Infertility; Suit Says Employer’s Refusal to Pay
is Form of Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1998, at B1 (reporting opinions of Mark G. Sokoloff,
Ms. Saks’s attorney, and an anonymous EEOC official regarding the impact of Bragdon on
employer health plan exclusion of infertility treatment); Sato, supra note 4, at 189-90
(“Many thought mandatory insurance coverage for infertility was a “slam dunk” after
Bradgon held that reproduction was a major life activity as defined by the ADA.”)
10. 316 F.3d 337, 345-46 (2d Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Saks II].
11. 141 F. Supp. 1266, 1277 (W.D.Wash. 2001).
12. See, e.g., Kimberly Horvath, Does Bragdon v. Abbott Provide the Missing Link for
Infertile Couples Seeking Protection Under the ADA?, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 819,
829 (1997-1999); John E. Estes, Employee Benefits or Employer “Subterfuge”: The
Americans with Disabilities Act’s Prohibition Against Discrimination in Health Plans, 12
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 85 (1994); Dion A. Sullivan, ERISA, the ADA, and AIDS: Fixing
Self-Insured Health Plans with Carparts, 7 MD. J. CONTEMP LEGAL ISSUES 423, 436 (1996);
Nancy R. Mansfield, Evolving Limitations on Coverage for AIDS: Implications for Health
Insurers and Employers Under the ADA and ERISA, 35 TORT & INS. L. J. 117 (1999).

Of course, notwithstanding the ability of a plaintiff to state cognizable
claims under civil rights laws, requiring plans to provide comprehensive (or
at least non-discriminatory) coverage of treatments for infertility is a
controversial issue. Opponents of legislative or judicially mandated
infertility coverage commonly argue that reproduction is simply a “lifestyle
choice,” and that increased coverage will further increase rising health care
costs. When examined critically, however, these arguments fail to justify
the pattern of exclusions. Indeed, infertility is still seen as a “woman’s
issue,” it is not a “lifestyle choice,” and the costs of comprehensive
coverage for treatment of infertility (in particular coverage of in vitro
fertilization) appear overstated. Moreover, appropriately comprehensive
coverage of treatment for infertility may lead to better, more humane and
cost-effective treatment.
In support of these conclusions, Part I of this Article provides a brief
overview of the disease of infertility, medical treatments of infertility, and
the cost of such treatments. Part II provides an overview of the important
but limited protections under federal and state law against discrimination in
benefits focusing on Title VII, the ADA and the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 197413 (“ERISA”). Against this backdrop, Part III
closely examines the decisions of the trial and appellate courts in Saks, and
the rejection of plaintiff’s challenges to the exclusion of certain infertility
treatments under the ADA, Title VII, PDA and state law. Part IV provides
a roadmap of alternative legal and factual analyses for Title VII and ADA
claims that could be successfully pursued by future plaintiffs. Finally, Part
V critically examines the policy arguments commonly raised in opposition
to coverage, including reproduction as a “lifestyle choice” and the fear of
increased health care costs, and concludes that public policy strongly
supports comprehensive coverage of infertility.
I. THE PROBLEM OF INFERTILITY
Infertility is defined by the medical community as “a disease or
condition of the reproductive system often diagnosed after a couple has had
one year of unprotected, well-timed intercourse, or if the woman has
The American Society of
suffered from multiple miscarriages.”14
————
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2002).
14. RESOLVE, The National Infertility Association, Frequently Asked Questions
About Infertility, at
http://www.resolve.org/main/national/trying/whatis/faq.jsp?name=&tage=whatis
(last visited Apr. 9, 2005) [hereinafter RESOLVE, Frequently Asked Questions]. See also
ASRM, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 1 (“a disease of the reproductive system

Reproductive Medicine (“ASRM”) estimates that infertility affects
approximately ten percent of the reproductive-age population in the United
States, or over 6 million people.15 The disease of infertility strikes people
of every race, ethnicity and socio-economic level,16 and more than one
million Americans seek treatment for infertility every year.17
The devastating emotional effects of the disease of infertility are well
documented.18 Facing the potential or actual loss of the ability to conceive
or carry a child, people diagnosed with infertility experience grief, anguish,
despair, and isolation. Many report that dealing with infertility is “the most
upsetting experience of their lives.”19 Indeed, in one widely cited study,
researchers found that women living with infertility experienced levels of
depression comparable to patients living with terminal diseases like
cancer.20
A. MEDICAL TREATMENTS FOR INFERTILITY

that impairs the body’s ability to perform the basic function of reproduction”); MERCK
RESEARCH LAB, MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION § 22, at ch. 254 (2d ed. 2003)
available at http://www.merck.com/mmhe/sec22/ch254/ch245a.html (last visited Apr. 9,
2005) (“the inability of a couple to achieve a pregnancy after repeated intercourse without
contraception for 1 year”). There is also secondary infertility, defined as the inability to
become pregnant, or to carry a pregnancy to term after the birth of one or more biological
children. RESOLVE reports that over three million Americans experience secondary
infertility. RESOLVE: The National Infertility Association, Secondary Infertility, at
http://www.resolve.org/main/national/treatment/diagnosis (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
15. ASRM, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 1. According to the National
Center for Health Statistics, approximately 5.4 million couples experience infertility every
year. RESOLVE, Coverage for Infertility, supra note 1.
16. See Horvath, supra note 12, at 820.
17. RESOLVE & DIANE ARONSON, RESOLVING INFERTILITY: UNDERSTANDING THE
OPTIONS AND CHOOSING SOLUTIONS WHEN YOU WANT TO HAVE A BABY 3 (1999) [hereinafter
RESOLVE, UNDERSTANDING YOUR TREATMENT OPTIONS].
18. See generally ASRM, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 1; Katherine T.
Pratt, Inconceivable? Deducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
1121, 1126-30 (2004) (summarizing reports and research regarding the extreme emotional
distress caused by infertility). Moreover, the negative effects of infertility may be longlasting. See Ann Lalos et al., The Psychosocial Impact of Infertility Two Years After
Completed Surgical Treatment, 64 ACTA OBSTET. GYNECOL. SCAND. 599, 599 (1985) (“The
negative emotional and social effects of infertility were pronounced both before and 2 years
after the surgical treatment.”); INFERTILITY supra note 1, at 119-35.
19. Ellen W. Freeman et al., Psychological Evaluation and Support in a Program of In
Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, 43 FERTILITY & STERILITY 48, 50 (1985) (noting
that 49% of women and 15% of men being treated for infertility described the experience
with this language).
20. Alice D. Domar et al., The Prevalence and Predictability of Depression in Infertile
Women, 58 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1158, 1161-62 (1992) (noting that the researchers were
not surprised to find that the “infertile women had higher depression scores than control
women”).

The medical diagnosis “infertility” encompasses a wide range of causes
and conditions. According to the ASRM, male factors and female factors
each account for about a third of infertility cases, and a combination of
male and female factors account for another ten percent of cases.21 In the
remaining cases – around twenty percent – the infertility is unexplained.22
Male factors include no or low sperm production, blocked passage of
sperm, problems with ejaculation, or immunological disorders that prevent
the sperm from penetrating the egg.23 Female factors include ovulation
disorders, blocked fallopian tubes, or structural problems or disorders of
the uterus or cervix.24 In both cases, the causes may result from a variety
of factors, including: congenital defects; hormonal imbalances; genetic
disorders; environmental factors; or previous illness, infection or surgery.
In addition, fertility rates for women gradually decline during the thirties,
and sharply decline after the age of forty. 25 Male fertility rates also decline
with age.26
Given the range of factors that may contribute to a diagnosis of
infertility, infertility can be treated in a variety of ways.27 Treatment can
include: advice and information regarding the reproductive cycle and
process; drug therapies such as clomiphene and gonadtropins to regulate
ovulation and to return female or male hormones to normal levels;28
surgery for treatment of female structural problems, such as laparoscopy to
repair or remove blockages from the fallopian tubes,29 or male structural
problems such as varicocele surgery to correct varicose veins;30 intrauterine
insemination (also called artificial insemination); and assisted reproductive
technologies such as in vitro fertilization (IVF).31
————
21. ASRM, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 1.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Horvath, supra note 12, at 821.
26. Id.
27. For a more detailed discussion of causes of infertility and treatment options, see
INFERTILITY supra note 1, at 117-32.
28. Bonny Gilbert, Infertility and the ADA: Health Insurance Coverage for Infertility
Treatment, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 42 (1996).
29. Id. Other surgically correctable female structural problems include endometriosis,
tubal blockage, the presence of fibroid tumors, DES, Asherman’s Syndrome and
Sdenomyosis. RESOLVE, UNDERSTANDING YOUR TREATMENT OPTIONS, supra note 17.
30. Gilbert, supra note 28. Other surgically correctable male structural problems and
obstructions partially or totally block the flow of sperm, seminal fluid or both. RESOLVE,
UNDERSTANDING YOUR TREATMENT OPTIONS, supra note 17.
31. RESOLVE, UNDERSTANDING YOUR TREATMENT OPTIONS, supra note 17.

The vast majority of cases of infertility – 85 to 90 percent – are
resolved with conventional medical treatment such as drugs or surgery.32
For the small percentage of cases not resolved through these means,
assisted reproductive technologies may be appropriate. Intrauterine
insemination is a relatively simple, non-surgical procedure in which
prepared sperm from a partner or donor is brought closer to the ova through
insertion into the woman’s uterus during her ovulatory phase.33 IVF is a
more complicated process in which the ova are removed from the woman’s
body by laproscopy, fertilized with semen from her partner or a donor,
incubated in a laboratory dish until an embryo develops, and then
transferred to the woman’s uterus. 34
B. THE COSTS OF INFERTILITY TREATMENTS
Given the range of treatments, the cost of medical treatment for
infertility varies greatly.35 For example, advice and information costs no
more than a general office visit.
The cost of clomiphene, a drug
commonly prescribed to women to induce regular ovulation, may be $50
for one month.36 Surgery to repair blocked fallopian tubes typically costs
between $10,000 and $15,000, and surgery to repair varicocele typically
costs $5,000 to $8,000.37 Repeated surgeries may be required to resolve
the infertility.38
————
32. ASRM, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 1. See also Stephen & Chandra,
supra note 1, at 134 (Of the surveyed women who received treatment for infertility, the
most common services provided were advice, diagnostic tests, medical help to prevent
miscarriage, and drugs to induce ovulation. Fewer than 13% used intrauterine insemination,
and fewer than 2% used assisted reproductive technologies such as IVF).
33. RESOLVE, UNDERSTANDING YOUR TREATMENT OPTIONS, supra note 17.
34. RESOLVE, The National Infertility Association, Intrauterine Insemination,
available at http://www.resolve.org/main/national/treatment/options.
Related assisted
reproductive technologies include gamete intra fallopian transfer (GIFT), in which the
retrieved ova are immediately combined with the sperm and inserted into the fallopian tube
during the laprascopy, and zygote intra fallopian transfer (ZIFT), in which the fertilized ova
is transferred into the fallopian tubes at the zygote, rather than the embryonic, stage of
development.
Id. at Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), available at
http://www.resolve.org/main/national/treatment/options.
35. See Pratt, supra note 18, at 1135 (discussing costs of various treatments).
36. RESOLVE, UNDERSTANDING YOUR TREATMENT OPTIONS, supra note 1 available
at http://www.resovle.org/main/national/treatment/options/medications (based on estimate
of $10 per pill, taken for five consecutive days); INFERTILITY supra note 1, at 141 (based
on 1986 data, average monthly cost of clomiphene is $30).
37. Pratt, supra note 18; INFERTILITY supra note 1, at 142 (based on 1986 data,
average total cost of tubal surgery is $7,118).
38. See Pratt, supra note 18, at 1137 (“where insurance covers tubal surgeries but not
IVF, a woman with blocked fallopian tubes may have several tubal ligation surgeries to

The assisted reproductive technologies used in the small percentage of
cases not resolved through drug therapy or surgeries also vary widely in
cost. Intrauterine insemination is relatively inexpensive, usually costing “a
few hundred dollars.”39 Estimates for IVF range from $8,000 to $10,000
per procedure,40 and patients often undergo multiple procedures.41 As these
figures show, although IVF is commonly thought to be the “big ticket item”
in the treatment of infertility, surgery is often as expensive, and in some
cases is more expensive.42 In fact, according to one widely-cited estimate,
assisted reproductive technologies such as IVF “account for only three
hundredths of one percent (0.03%) of U.S. healthcare costs.” 43
II. PROTECTIONS AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN BENEFITS
If an employer44 elects to offer a health care benefit plan to its
employees, the content of coverage must comply with applicable federal
laws, including Title VII and the ADA.45 Although the protections offered
attempt to repair her tubes, instead of bypassing the tubes with IVF”); INFERTILITY supra
note 1, at 143.
39. Pratt, supra note 18 at 1135; See also INFERTILITY supra note 1, at 141 (based
on 1986 data, average cost of intrauterine insemination is $50 to $100).
40. P.J. Neuman et al., The Cost of a Successful Delivery with In Vitro Fertilization,
331 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 239, 239-43 (1994) (calculating average cost of IVF as $8,000 per
cycle); Adam Sonfield, Drive for Insurance Coverage of Infertility Raises Questions of
Equity, Cost, 2 THE GUTTMACHER REPORT (Oct. 1999) available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/02/5/gr020504.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2005) (IVF
costs $10,000 per attempt); ASRM, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 1 (the average
cost of IVF in the U.S. is $12,400).
41. According to a report published by the CDC and ASRM, 32.8% ART cycles
reported in 2001 resulted in a clinical pregnancy, and 82.2% of those pregnancies resulted in
a live birth. See CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 2001 Assisted Reproduction Technology
Success Rates: National Summary and Fertility Clinic Reports (Dec. 2003) available at
http://www.cdc.gov. See also INFERTILITY supra note 1, at 293 (reporting that based on
1986 data, 15-20% of IVF treatments performed by expert clinics resulted in a live birth).
42. See Bradley J. Van Voohris et al., Cost Effectiveness of Infertility Treatments: A
Cohort Study, 67 FERTILITY & STERILITY 830, 835 (May 1997) (comparing total cost per
delivery, IVF is more cost effective than surgery for women with blocked fallopian tubes).
43. ASRM, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 1.
44. This Article refers to plans as sponsored by a single employer, although a plan may
also be sponsored by an employee organization, or jointly by multiple employers or
employee organizations under ERISA. See 29 USCS § 1002(B) (2005).
45. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, DECISION ON COVERAGE OF
CONTRACEPTION (Dec. 14, 2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decisioncontraception.html (“ERISA preempts certain state laws that regulate insurance but
explicitly exempts federal law from preemption . . . [T]he fact that ERISA does not require
health plans to ‘provide specific benefits’ does not mean that other statutes – namely Title

by civil rights law in this area are important, they are limited.46 Nor, as
scholars have noted,47 are state law mandates requiring coverage of certain
conditions or treatments likely to lead to uniform results because of the
preemption provisions of ERISA.
A. TITLE VII AND SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
practices that “discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”48 In 1978,
the PDA amended Title VII to clarify that discrimination “because of sex”
included discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions.”49

VII – do not impose such requirements where necessary to avoid or correct
discrimination.”).
46. Other civil rights laws also apply to employer health plans. See Sharona Hoffman,
AIDS Caps, Contraceptive Coverage, and the Law: An Analysis of the Federal AntiDiscrimination Statutes’ Applicability to Health Insurance, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1318
(2002) (characterizing the protections offered by federal law, including Title VII, the ADA,
the Equal Pay Act, the ADEA and HIPAA, the area of health insurance as containing
“significant gaps and loopholes”).
47. See, e.g., id.; Colleen E. Medill, HIPAA and Its Related Legislation: A New Role
for ERISA in the Regulation of Private Health Care Plans?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 485, 491-92
(1998); John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311, 352-61
(1997).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
49 Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)).

Employment benefits include health care benefits.50 If an employer
elects to offer a health care benefit, it has a legal obligation to make sure
that the plan does not discriminate based on sex-based characteristics and
that it provides equally comprehensive coverage for both sexes.51 Under
the PDA, an otherwise inclusive plan that singles out pregnancy-related
benefits for exclusion is discriminatory.52 The additional cost of offering
non-discriminatory benefits, if any, is not a defense.53
A plaintiff may pursue a claim of discrimination under Title VII under
either a theory of disparate treatment or of disparate impact.54 A plaintiff
alleging disparate treatment must show that her employer intentionally
treated her differently than other employees because of her sex.55 For
example, an employee who alleges that her employer’s plan paid infertility
benefits for male employees, but not for female employees, states a claim
of disparate treatment under Title VII.56 The landmark case of Erickson v.
Bartell Drug Company,57 decided in 2001, provides another example. In
that case, plaintiffs claimed that their employer’s policy of excluding
coverage for prescription contraception from an “otherwise
comprehensive”58 health plan constituted sex discrimination under Title
————
50. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983);
See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9 (2004) (prohibiting discrimination with regard to fringe
benefits, including medical, hospital, accident, life insurance and retirement benefits, as
compensation).
51. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1272 (citation omitted).
52. See Newport News, 462 U.S. 669, 683-85.
53. Los Angeles Dep’t. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978).
54. See Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977). A plaintiff
alleging disparate treatment must show that her employer intentionally treated her
differently than other employees because of her sex. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 at 802-03 (1973) (discussing prima facie case of disparate treatment).
A plaintiff alleging disparate treatment must show that a facially neutral employment
practice “in fact fall[s] more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by
business necessity,” and need not prove discriminatory intent. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,
431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15 (1977). There is also a third theory, sexual harassment, which
includes both quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment. See Meritor
Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
55. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 792 (discussing prima facie case of
disparate treatment).
56. Such a plaintiff may also state a claim under both the PDA and the ADA. See
Bielicki v. City of Chicago, No. 97 C 1471, 1997 WL 260595, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 1977);
see also Cooley v. Daimler Chrysler, 281 F. Supp. 2d 979, 988 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (denying
motion to dismiss female plaintiff’s action alleging that the exclusion of prescription
contraceptives constituted disparate treatment under Title VII).
57. 141 F. Supp. 2d. 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
58. The court noted that the plan excluded only a handful of products, including
contraceptive devices, drugs prescribed for weight reduction, infertility drugs, smoking

VII. In granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on their claim of
disparate treatment, the Court held that Title VII requires employers to
recognize the differences between the sexes and provide equally
comprehensive health coverage, even if that means providing additional
benefits to cover expenses incurred only by women.59 Relying in part on
the PDA,60 the Court held that “[m]ale and female employees have
different, sex-based disability and healthcare needs, and the law is no
longer blind to the fact that only women can get pregnant, bear children, or
use prescription contraception.”61 Indeed, the special or increased health
care needs associated with a woman’s unique sex-based characteristics
must be met to the same extent, and on the same terms, as other healthcare
needs. 62
A plaintiff alleging disparate impact must show that a facially neutral
employment practice “in fact fall[s] more harshly on one group than
another and cannot be justified by business necessity,” and need not prove
discriminatory intent.63 Some courts appear reluctant to rule on disparate
impact claims in the context of health care coverage. For example, in
Erickson, plaintiffs asserted claims of disparate treatment and disparate
impact. The Court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment
on the disparate treatment theory only, and did not address the disparate
impact claim.64

cessation drugs, dermatologicals for cosmetic purposes, growth hormones, and experimental
drugs. Id. at 1268 n.1.
59. Of course, it has not been established that coverage of prescription contraceptives
would represent a significant additional cost. Indeed, one widely cited figure states that it
only costs an employer $1.43 per employee per month to add full contraceptive benefits to a
health plan. See, e.g., James Trussell, The Economic Value of Contraception: A
Comparison of 15 Methods, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 494 (Apr. 1995).
60. The Court did not base its holding solely on the PDA, however. It also held that
“regardless of whether the prevention of pregnancy falls within the phrase ‘pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions,’ Congress’ decisive overruling of General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert [in the PDA] . . . evidences an interpretation of Title VII which necessarily
precludes the choices Bartell has made in this case.” Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
61. Id. at 1271.
62. Id.
63. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15.
64. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1277. Similarly, the Court in Saks acknowledged that
Ms. Saks’s allegation of disparate impact was properly raised, but that it failed on the facts
as she did not show that female employees were more adversely affected by the exclusion of
fertility treatments than male employees. Saks II, 316 F.3d at 347 n.5 (plaintiff’s disparate
impact claim fails because she did not show that female participants were more adversely
affected by the exclusion of fertility treatments than male participants); see also Krauel v.
Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 644.

B. THE ADA AND DISABILITY-BASED DISCRIMINATION
Over 25 years after the enactment of Title VII, the ADA was enacted to
“provide clear, strong, consistent, [and] enforceable standards [for] ending
discrimination against individuals with disabilities,” and to bring such
individuals into the economic and social mainstream of American life.65
The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating on the basis of
disability against a qualified individual with a disability66 in regard to
fringe benefits including participation in an employer-sponsored health
insurance plan.67 Employers can be liable for disability-based
discriminatory benefits they provide themselves, as well as benefits that
they contract with third-parties (such as plan administrators and insurance
companies) to provide.68
As with Title VII, an ADA plaintiff can pursue a claim of employment
discrimination based on disparate treatment or disparate impact.69 In the
context of cases alleging discrimination in benefits, disparate treatment
theory is more commonly used.70 A plaintiff alleging disparate treatment in
————
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b) (2000). The ADA reaches beyond employment, and into
public services, public transportation, public accommodations and telecommunications. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
66. See infra, notes 104-107 and accompanying text for a definition of “disability”
within the meaning of the ADA; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
67. See 29 C.F.R § 1630.4(f) (stating that an employer may not discriminate on the
basis of disability with respect to “[f]ringe benefits available by virtue of employment,
whether or not administered by the “employer]”); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, EEOC INTERIM GUIDANCE ON APPLICATION OF ADA TO DISABILITY-BASED
DISTINCTIONS IN EMPLOYER PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE (June 8, 1993), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/health.html [hereinafter EEOC Interim Guidance]
(“[e]mployee benefit plans, including health insurance plans provided by an employer to its
employees, are a fringe benefit available by virtue of employment. Generally speaking,
therefore, the ADA prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of disability in the
provision of health insurance to their employees”); Parker v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d
1006, 1014-15 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing these sources and collecting cases).
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2000). See also Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store,
924 F. Supp. 763, 781 (E.D. Tex. 1996); EEOC Interim Guidance, supra note 67.
69. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 55 (2003) (recognizing disparate
treatment and disparate impact claims under the ADA). Disability-based harassment is also
a cognizable claim. Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physicians Servs,, Inc., 286 F.3d 798 (5th Cir.
2002) (recognizing disability-based harassment claim under the ADA).
70. Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Health Care and the Americans with Disabilities Act:
Access to Health Care for Individuals with Hearing Impairments, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1101
(2000) (“In the context of insurance coverage, however, disparate impact analysis cannot be
utilized.”); Daniel A. Engel, The ADA and Life, Health, and Disability Insurance: Where is
the Liability?, 33 TORT & INS. L. J. 227, 236 (1997) (“The ADA prohibits under a disparate
impact analysis conduct that, although facially neutral, has an adverse discriminatory effect

this context must show that she, a qualified individual with a disability, did
not have equal access to benefits.71
“Equal access” is measured in two ways. First, the challenged
distinction must be based on a disability as defined by the ADA.
According to the EEOC, a distinction is disability-based if it singles out a
particular disability, a discrete group of disabilities or disability in general
for different treatment.72 However, courts have generally recognized that
the ADA does not require an employer to offer health plan benefits that
provide the same level of benefits for all disabilities.73 For example,
several courts have held that an employer may offer a disability insurance
policy that caps benefits for mental, but not physical, disabilities without
running afoul of the ADA.74
Second, even if the distinction is disability-based, it may still be
permissible if it falls within the ADA’s “safe harbor” clause. Specifically,
this clause provides that the ADA shall not be construed to prohibit or
restrict “establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a
bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying
risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with
State law . . . or that [are] not subject to State laws that regulate
insurance.”75 As this language suggests and the regulations make clear:
on employment. However, Section 501(c) eliminated to a large degree the disparate impact
analysis as it relates to the setting of coverage under ERISA plans.”).
71. Saks II, 316 F.3d at 343; See also EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, A
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITY ACT, § 7.9-7.12 (1992).
72. EEOC Interim Guidance, supra note 67.
73. Although an employer may draw disability-based distinctions in coverage, it may
not simply deny coverage based on a disability. Anderson, 924 F. Supp. at 781. An
employee of a small business was diagnosed with AIDS, a disability within the meaning of
the ADA. When his condition was revealed to his employer’s group health insurer, the
premiums were raised and the employer sought a different group insurer. The new insurer
excluded individuals with AIDS from participation in their plans. The court found “that if
an employer switches to a group health insurer that categorically denies coverage to an
employee with a disability because of that disability (here, AIDS), the employer has violated
the ADA because it has not provided equal access to insurance for disabled and nondisabled employees.
74. See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1008; Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3rd
Cir. 1998); Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1101 (10th Cir. 1999); Lewis v.
Kmart, 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999); but see Johnson v. K-Mart, 273 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir.
2001).
75 Specifically, the statute provides that the ADA shall not be construed to prohibit or
restrict the following:
(1) an insurer, hospital or medical service company, health maintenance organization,
or any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or similar organizations from
underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on
or not inconsistent with State law; or

the ADA is not intended to disrupt the current regulatory
structure for self-insured employers or disrupt the current
nature of insurance underwriting, or current insurance
industry practices in sales underwriting, pricing,
administrative and other services, claims and similar
insurance-related activities based on classifications of risks
as regulated by the states.76
As this section suggests, the funding of the plan makes a difference.
Bona fide,77 ERISA-regulated insured plans with disability-based
distinctions will be protected by the safe harbor if the plan’s sponsor can
show that the distinction is actuarially justified, and is based on permissible
classification of risks. Plans can also be self-funded, meaning that the
employer assumes all or part of the risk of paying for the benefits instead of
purchasing a health care coverage policy from an insurance company.78 In
contrast to insured plans, self-funded plans will be upheld—whether or not
they are based on sound actuarial analyses—unless the distinctions can be
shown to be subterfuge for discrimination.79
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring,
observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on
underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on
or not inconsistent with State law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring,
observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject
to State laws that regulate insurance.
42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2000); 29 C.F.R. §1630.16(f) (2004).
76. 29 C.F.R. 1630.16(f).
77. Under the Age Discrimination in Employee Act (“ADEA”), a “bona fide” plan has
been defined as one that exists and pays benefits. See, e.g., United Air Lines v. McMann,
434 U.S. 192, 194 (1977); Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 161 (1989).
Several courts have adopted that definition for purposes of the ADA, as well. See, e.g. Fitts
v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 236 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C.C. 2001); EEOC v. Aramark Corp., 208 F.3d
266, 269 (D.C.C. 2000); Piquard v. City of East Peoria, 887 F. Supp. 1106 (C.D.Ill. 1995).
78. See 27 AM. JUR. 2d Employment Relationship § 109 (2002); The Kaiser Family
Foundation, Employer Health Benefits 2003 Annual Survey, 127 available at
http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/20672_1.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2005); Employee
Benefits Research Institute, EBRI Health Benefits Databook 91 (1999) (comparing selffunded and insured plans). Self-funded plans are sometimes referred to as “self-insured”
plans, although there is no insurance policy involved. A plan can also be partially selffunded, meaning that the employer bears the risk up to some stop-loss threshold, after which
an insurer bears or shares the risk for additional claims. Gail A. Jensen & Jon R. Gabel,
The Erosion of Purchased Insurance, 25 INQUIRY 328, 329 (1988) (“Jensen & Gabel, The
Erosion of Purchased Insurance”).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (“Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a
subterfuge to evade the purposes of subchapter I and III of this chapter.”); Jensen & Gabel,

C. ERISA PREEMPTION AND STATE LAW MANDATES
ERISA was intended to encourage the formation of pension and
welfare benefits plans, and to protect employees’ rights within such plans
by “establishing standards of conduct, responsibility and obligation for
fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate
remedies, sanctions and ready access to the Federal courts.”80 Although
aimed primarily at pension benefits, ERISA also regulates employersponsored welfare benefit plans, such as health benefits.81
In recent terms, the Supreme Court has repeatedly turned its attention
toward ERISA and the scope of its preemption provisions.82 Although,
generally, ERISA does not require that any employer provide a health care
benefit plan, nor does it govern the content of a health care benefit plan in
the event an employer elects to offer one,83 the structure and interpretation
The Erosion of Purchased Insurance at 329; see also Saks II, 316 F.3d at 341; Leonard v.
Israel Discount Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1999); Henzel v. Del. Otsego Corp.,
285 F. Supp. 2d 271, 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
80. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44 (1987) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §
1001(b)); see also Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §
1001(b)).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
82. See, e.g., Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (Plaintiffs’ causes of action under Texas Health
Care Liability Act completely preempted by ERISA § 502); Kentucky Ass’n of Health Plans
Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003) (Kentucky’s “any willing provider law” not preempted
by ERISA); Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 335 (2002) (Illinois law
requiring independent medical review of benefit denials based on medical necessity
considerations not preempted by ERISA); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001)
(Washington law automatically revoking designation of spouse of beneficiary upon divorce
preempted by ERISA); UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999)
(California’s notice-prejudice rule not preempted by ERISA). The Court also decided
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000), in which it held that mixed eligibility-treatment
decisions by HMOS are not fiduciary acts within the meaning of ERISA. Pegram has been
cited for its distinction between eligibility and treatment decisions in preemption cases
involving medical malpractice and negligence claims against managed care organizations.
See, e.g. Cicio v. Vytra Healthcare, 321 F.3d 83, 100-05 (2d Cir. 2003); Pryzbowski v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2001).
83. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 668 (1995) (noting that ERISA does not require employer to provide
any given set of minimum benefits); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983)
(noting that “ERISA does not mandate that employers provide any particular benefits, and
does not itself proscribe discrimination in the provision of employee benefits.”). There have
been specific amendments to ERISA aimed at requiring coverage for specific conditions or
treatments. For example, ERISA has been amended to require that health care benefit plans
include coverage for post-delivery hospital stays, see 29 U.S.C. § 1185 (2000), and to
require coverage for certain post-mastectomy treatment and care, including reconstruction,
see 29 U.S.C. § 1185b (2000). Similarly, ERISA could be amended to provide coverage for

of ERISA’s express preemption provisions84 created increasingly
inconsistent results for the content of ERISA-regulated health care plans.
1. State Laws that “Relate to” a Plan are Preempted
In an attempt to create uniform administration of employee benefit
plans,85 ERISA contains a broad preemption clause that preempts state law
insofar as it “relates to” employee benefit plans, and ERISA provides the
exclusive remedial scheme for claims relating to employee benefit plans.86
Although initially given an expansive interpretation,87 the Supreme Court
narrowed the reach of the preemption clause in a 1995 case, New York
infertility treatments to some degree, or to treat such coverage equitably in light of other
covered treatments and conditions. Indeed, The Family Building Act of 2003 introduced in
the House of Representatives in September of last year, would require all health plans –
including ERISA-regulated plans – that cover obstetrical benefits to cover infertility
treatments as well. H.R. 3014, 108th Cong. (2003). The Act would also amend ERISA so
that it would not preempt state laws that provide greater infertility-related benefits, thus
ensuring that self-funded plans would be required to provide the coverage under either state
or federal law. H.R. 3014 (2003) (proposed amendment at Sec. Sec 714(a), incorporating
amendment to Public Health Service Act, including preemption section, by reference)). To
date, attempts to enact the Act into law have failed. For an analysis of these and other
similar targeted reforms of ERISA in health care reform, see Colleen E. Medill, HIPAA and
Its Related Legislation: A New Role for ERISA in the Regulation of Private Health Care
Plans?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 485, 506 (1998).
84. This article focuses on ERISA’s express preemption provisions in Section 514.
ERISA also provides for complete preemption under Section 502(a) with respect to claims
for benefits due under a plan, to enforce rights under a plan, or to clarify future rights under
the terms of a plan, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000). See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654. For
examples of conflict preemption analysis under ERISA, see Davila, 542 U.S. 200
(Plaintiffs’ causes of action under Texas Health Care Liability Act completely preempted
because they duplicate, supplement or supplant ERISA’s list of exclusive remedies); Boggs
v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 874 (1997) (Louisiana community property law that allowed the
spouse of a participant to designate a beneficiary of ERISA-regulated survivor annuity
preempted under traditional conflict preemption analysis because it directly conflicted with
ERISA’s anti-alienation protections).
85. See, e.g., Aetna, 542 U.S. 200 (2004) (“the purpose of ERISA is to provide a
uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans.”); Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657 (“the
basic thrust of the preemption clause . . . was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to
permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans”).
86. ERISA § 502; 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000). Specifically, the “preemption clause”
provides “[e]xcept as provided in [the savings clause]. . .[ERISA shall] supersede any and
all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”
ERISA § 514; 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000).
87. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (a state law relates to an
employee benefit plan for purposes of ERISA preemption if it has a connection with or
reference to such a plan).

State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
in which it held that a state law relates to an ERISA plan if it specifically
refers to ERISA plans, mandates employee benefits structures or their
administration, or provides alternative enforcement mechanisms for ERISA
rights. 88
At least fifteen states have enacted some type of infertility insurance
coverage law requiring insurers to offer or to cover certain infertility
treatments.89 In the context of an action for health plan benefits, such state
law mandates would be preempted (at least initially) by ERISA’s broad
preemption clause because they “relate to” a benefit plan.
2. State Laws that “Regulate Insurance” are Saved
The second part of ERISA’s preemption analysis, the “savings clause,”
saves specific state laws regulating insurance, banking and securities law
from preemption.90 In order to escape preemption, the state law must be
“specifically directed toward” insurance, and not simply a law of general
application that has some bearing upon insurers.91 In defining the
regulation of insurance for the purpose of this clause, courts traditionally
applied a “common sense view,” and then looked to three factors
developed under the McCarran-Ferguson Act:92 (1) whether the practice
has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder’s risk; (2) whether
the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer
————
88. 514 U.S. 645, 668 (1995) (holding that a New York law requiring hospitals to
collect surcharge from patients covered by a commercial insurer but not from patients
covered by a Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan was not preempted by ERISA because the law did
not “relate to” employee benefit plans within the meaning of ERISA’s preemption clause).
89. A state law mandating offer of coverage requires insurance companies to offer a
policy with infertility coverage, but does not require employers to select or pay for such
coverage. A state law mandating coverage requires insurance companies to include
infertility coverage in every policy offered. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-536 (1989)
(requires health insurance organizations to offer coverage for the medically necessary
expenses of the diagnosis and treatment of infertility, including IVF) with ARK. CODE. ANN.
§§ 23-85-137, 23-86-118 (1987) (requires health insurance companies to cover the expenses
of IVF procedures). See National Conference of State Legislatures, 50 States Summary of
Legislation Related To Insurance Coverage for Infertility Therapy, June 2004 (summarizes
state
infertility
insurance
coverage
laws)
available
at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/50infert.htm.
90. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2002).
91. Miller, 538 U.S. at 334 (collected case law).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). As noted in Rush Prudential, “The McCarran-Ferguson Act
requires that the business of insurance be subject to state regulation, and, subject to certain
exceptions mandates that “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate . . . any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance ….” 536 U.S.
355, 366 n.4 (2002).

and the insured; and (3) whether the practice is limited to entities within the
insurance industry.93 For example, in the 1986 case Metropolitan Life v.
Massachusetts, the Supreme Court held that a Massachusetts statute
mandating minimum mental health care benefits in health insurance
policies was a statute regulating insurance, and therefore was saved from
preemption. 94
In a 2003 case, Kentucky Association of Health Plans v. Miller,95 a
unanimous Supreme Court made a “clean break” from the McCarranFerguson Act factors, and held that a state law “regulates insurance” for
purposes of ERISA if it: (1) is “specifically directed toward entities
engaged in insurance”; and (2) substantially affects the risk pooling
arrangement between the insurer and the insured.96 This new test
broadened the reach of the savings clause, and will likely save more state
laws directed at insurance and insurance practices from preemption.97
Although the results of the Court’s holding in Miller in this respect remain
to be seen, in the context of an ERISA benefits-due action, state laws
mandating benefits will continue to be saved from preemption under this
clause as state laws regulating insurance.98
————
93. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 743 (1985) (citing
Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982)); Rush Prudential, 536 U.S.
365, 373.
94. 471 U.S. 724, 758 (1985).
95. 538 U.S. at 324.
96. Id. at 343.
97. The Supreme Court in Miller broadened the reach of the savings clause, and may
save more state laws directed at insurance and insurance practices from preemption.
Specifically, the Court held that “entities engaged in insurance” includes insurers, selffunded plans, and parties providing administrative services to self-funded plans. Id. at 337
n.1. The Court explained, “ERISA’s savings clause does not require that a state law
regulate ‘insurance companies’ or even ‘the business of insurance’ to be saved from
preemption; it need only be a ‘law . . . which regulates insurance,’ and self-insured plans
engage in the same sort of risk pooling arrangements as separate entities that provide
insurance to an employee benefit plan.” Id. With regard to the second requirement, the
Court found that the state law merely had to substantially affect the risk pooling
arrangement, and did not have to actually spread risk or change the terms of the insurance
policy. Id. at 338. On the facts, the Court found that Kentucky’s law met the first
requirement because it was directed at HMOs in their capacities as both insurers and
administrative service providers. Id. at 337 n.1. The Court found that the second
requirement was met because Kentucky’s law “substantially affected the bargain between
insurers and insureds . . . [b]y expanding the number of providers from whom an insured
may receive health services.” Id. at 338.
98. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)
(Massachusetts law mandating coverage of certain mental health benefits saved from
ERISA preemption under savings clause); see also Macro v. Indep. Health Ass’n, 180 F.
Supp.2d 427, 436 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (New York law prohibiting insurers from denying

3. The Exception for Self-Funded Plans
The third and final part of ERISA’s preemption analysis is the “deemer
clause,” which provides that self-funded employee welfare plans cannot be
deemed insurance plans for purposes of preemption analysis.99 Because
self-funded plans cannot be deemed insurance plans, specific state laws
directed at insurance generally are not saved with respect to self-funded
plans, and self-funded plans have not been considered subject to specific
state regulation.100
In the context of state laws mandating coverage of a certain treatment
or condition, it is well documented that this exemption leads to
dramatically different results because such laws apply to insured plans, but
not to self-funded plans.101
III. THE FIRST APPLICATION OF BRAGDON TO BENEFITS
In the last few years, the federal courts have issued important civil
rights decisions regarding insurance coverage of treatments or conditions
associated with sex and disability.102 The lower court’s decision in Saks
garnered attention because it was the first to apply the Supreme Court’s
coverage for correctable medical conditions resulting in infertility or based on infertility
saved from ERISA preemption under savings clause).
99. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
100. See id; FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 63 (1990) (interpreting deemer
clause broadly to exempt self-funded plan ERISA-regulated plans from state regulation and
state law claims).
101. Of course, this effect is not limited to state laws mandating benefits. As authors
have noted, the deemer clause exempts self-funded plans from a variety of other state laws,
as well. Jon R. Gabel et al., Marketwatch: Self-Insurance in Times of Growing and
Retreating Managed Care, HEALTH AFF. (Mar./Apr. 2003) [hereinafter Self-Insurance]
(noting that the deemer clause exempts self-funded plans from a range of state law
regulations including “state financial reserve requirements to minimize the risk of
insolvency; state imposed premium taxes to finance state guaranty funds to pay claims of
insolvent plans; state charges to finance high risk pools that provide coverage of uninsurable
people; various consumer protection laws, or state insurance reforms intended to minimize
harsh medical underwriting.”) For a discussion of the regulation of self-insured plans,
including stop-loss plans, see generally Jeffrey G. Lenhart, ERISA Preemption: The Effect
of Stop-Loss Insurance on Self-Insured Health Plans, 14 VA. TAX REV. 615 (1995);
Kenneth M. Coughlin, Filling the Gaps in Stop-Loss Insurance, BUS. & HEALTH, Sept.
1992; Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Preemption and Regulation of Managed Health Care:
The Case for Managed Federalism, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 251, 275-77 (1997); Dennis K.
Schaeffer, Insuring the Protection of ERISA Plan Participants: ERISA Preemption and the
Federal Government’s Duty To Regulate Self-Insured Health Plans, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1085,
1108 (1999).
102. See, e.g., Saks II, 316 F.3d 337 (2003); Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (2001).

decision in Bragdon recognizing reproduction as a major life activity under
the ADA to infertility.103 However, in Saks the Second Circuit held that an
employer’s health plan could lawfully exclude coverage for infertility
procedures that were only performed on women without violating Title VII
or the ADA. What happened?
A. THE BRAGDON DECISION
In contrast to Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination “because of
[...] sex” which protects both men and women,104 the ADA protects only a
narrowly defined group of individuals who meet the statutory definition of
“disabled.” “Disability” is defined as having: “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities”; or “a
record of such impairment”; or “being regarded as having such an
impairment regardless of whether the individual actually has the
impairment.”105 A major life activity is “substantially limit[ed]” if the
individual is unable to perform a major life activity that the average person
in the general population can perform, or is significantly restricted as to the
condition, manner, or duration under which he or she can perform the
activity, as compared to the general population.106 Major life activities
include, but are not limited to, caring for one’s self, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working.107
In 1996 the Eight Circuit held in Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical
Center that the ADA’s list of major life activities should not be
expanded.108 In Krauel, an employee brought an action against her
employer under both the ADA and the PDA challenging the exclusion of
coverage for infertility treatment under the employer’s health plan.109 On
appeal from summary judgment for the employer, the employee argued that
her undisputed impairment of infertility affected the major life activities of
reproduction and caring for others. 110 The Eighth Circuit agreed that the
employee’s infertility was a physical impairment that prevented her from
————
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

524 U.S. 624 (1998).
Newport News, 462 U.S. at 682.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
29 C.F.R.§ 1630.2(j).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 675.
Id. at 676-77.

becoming pregnant naturally.111 It declined, however, to expand the nonexclusive list of major life activities, and thus held that the impairment did
not substantially affect any recognized major life activity.112
Prior to Krauel, at least two district courts had found that reproduction
was a major life activity within the meaning of the ADA.113 Two years
later and in a different context, the Supreme Court in Bragdon v. Abbott114
settled the question and held that reproduction is major life activity. In
Bragdon, an HIV-positive patient sued her dentist under the ADA for his
refusal to treat her in his office. The Supreme Court first established that
her HIV-positive status was an impairment that substantially limited her
ability to reproduce because of the risk to her partner and child.115
Rejecting the petitioner’s arguments that medication may significantly
lower the risk of transmission at birth, the Court noted, “[i]t cannot be said
as a matter of law that an 8% risk of transmission a dread and fatal disease
to one’s child does not represent a substantial limitation on reproduction
[...] The Act addresses substantial limitations on major life activities, not
utter inabilities.”116 The Court then held that reproduction is a major life
activity within the meaning of the ADA, because “[r]eproduction and the
sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process itself.” 117
B. APPLYING BRAGDON TO BENEFITS: THE SAKS DECISION
Many lawyers, activists and scholars thought that coverage for
infertility treatment would follow soon after the Supreme Court’s decision
in Bragdon recognizing reproduction as a major life activity within the
meaning of the ADA.118 However, in the first major case applying
Bragdon to health benefits, Saks, the Second Circuit held that an
————
111. Id. at 677.
112. Id. (“Although Krauel is unable to conceive without medical intervention, she has
the ability to care for herself, perform manual tasks, walk, see, hear, speak, breathe, learn,
and work. It is undisputed that her infertility in no way prevented her from performing her
full job duties as a respiratory therapist.”)
113. Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316, 323 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Pacourek
v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. Ill. 1996); but see Zatarain v. WDSU-Television
Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D.La. 1995).
114. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
115. Id. at 639-40.
116. Id. at 641.
117. Id. at 638.
118. See Gross, supra note 9 (reporting opinions of Mark G. Sokoloff, Ms. Saks’s
attorney, and an anonymous EEOC official regarding the impact of Bragdon on employer
health plan exclusion of infertility treatment); Sato, supra note 4 at 220 (“Many thought
mandatory insurance coverage for infertility was a “slam dunk” after Bradgon held that
reproduction was a major life activity as defined by the ADA.”).

employer’s health plan could lawfully exclude coverage for infertility
procedures performed solely on women without violating Title VII or the
ADA.
1. The District Court Decision
Rochelle Saks’s self-funded ERISA-regulated health plan (the “Plan”)
denied coverage for surgical impregnation procedures for infertility. The
plan covered a variety of infertility products and procedures including
“ovulation kits, oral fertility drugs, penile prosthetic implants (when
certified by a physician to be medically necessary), and nearly all surgical
infertility treatments.”119 The Plan excluded “surgical impregnation
procedures, including artificial insemination, IVF or embryo and fetal
implants,” regardless of medical necessity. 120
In the course of her treatment, Saks used several covered products and
processes, and also underwent intrauterine insemination procedures and
two cycles of IVF. She became pregnant three times during the course of
treatment, but all three pregnancies ended in miscarriage. Her employer
refused coverage of the intrauterine insemination and IVF procedures, as
well as the related office visits and drug and monitoring expenses, on the
basis that they were expressly excluded from coverage as surgical
impregnation procedures.121
After receiving a probable cause
determination from the EEOC,122 Saks filed an action against her employer
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
alleging that the Plan’s exclusion of infertility treatments that can only be
performed on women – artificial insemination, IVF, and in utero

————
119. Saks II, 316 F.3d at 341.
120. Id.
121. Saks II, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23. Her employer, through a third-party
administrator, initially also refused coverage for pregnancy and miscarriage-related
expenses after her first miscarriage. Ms. Saks’s internal appeal of that denial was
successful. Id.
122. An employee alleging employment discrimination under the ADA must pursue an
administrative claim with the EEOC prior to filing suit. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). The
EEOC may investigate the claim to determine whether there is “reasonable cause to believe
that an unlawful employment practice has occurred or is occurring.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24
(2003). If it finds reasonable cause and the matter cannot be resolved with the employer,
the EEOC may issue a “determination that reasonable cause exists to believe that an
unlawful employment practice has occurred or is occurring,” which allows plaintiff to
proceed with a lawsuit. Id. § 1601.21; see also § 1601.19.

insemination – violated Title VII, the PDA, the ADA and New York law.123
The district court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment on
all claims.
a. The Title VII Claim
The district court held that the Plan did not violate Title VII because
men and women receive the same benefits and are subject to the same
exclusions under the plan -- both men and women have “equal access” to
certain types of infertility treatments, and neither men nor women may
receive benefits for other types of infertility treatment. The district court
explained, “[i]t is no answer to say that the excluded treatments can only be
performed on women, because male employees can claim infertility-related
benefits for treatment performed on their wives – and are, conversely,
precluded from obtaining benefits for surgical impregnation of their
wives.”124
Similarly, the district court held that infertility is a “pregnancy related
condition” covered by the PDA under Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson
Controls,125 but that the Plan did not violate the PDA because it provides
equal coverage for male and female employees who suffer from
infertility.126
b. The ADA Claim
The district court held that although infertility is a disability within the
meaning of the ADA under Bragdon, the plan’s exclusion of certain
infertility treatments performed on women only did not violate the ADA
because the plan offered the same insurance coverage to fertile and infertile
employees.
The court also found that the Plan was not covered by the ADA
because it was a bona fide, ERISA-regulated and self-funded plan within
the ADA’s “safe harbor” provision described above. Finding that “[t]he
only self-insured plans that fall outside the ADA’s safe harbor are those
that are used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the statute,” the court
held that because the exclusion for surgical impregnation procedures pre————
123. Saks II, 117 F. Supp.2d at 320. Ms. Saks’s state law claims were for breach of
contract and violation of New York Executive Law § 296 prohibiting discrimination in
employment. Id.
124. Saks II, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 328.
125. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
126. Saks II, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 329.

dated the effective date of the ADA, it could not be considered a subterfuge
as a matter of law.127
c. ERISA and the State Law Claims
Ms. Saks also raised claims of breach of contract and violation of New
York Human Rights law. The district court granted summary judgment on
these state law claims as preempted by ERISA, notwithstanding the
employer’s failure to timely raise ERISA preemption as a defense in its
answer.128
2. The Appellate Court Opinion
Ms. Saks appealed from the grant of summary judgment on all but the
ADA claim. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the
district court, but on different grounds.
a. The Title VII Claim
The appellate court first clarified that the district court’s use of the
“equal access” standard under Title VII was incorrect. The issue was not
equal access to a single set of benefits, but whether the set of benefits
provided equitable coverage to women and men. In the words of the court,
the “proper inquiry in reviewing a sex discrimination challenge to a health
benefits plan is whether sex-specific conditions exist, and if so, whether
exclusion of benefits for those conditions results in a plan that provides
inferior coverage to one sex.”129
Applying this standard, the appellate court found that “[a]lthough the
surgical procedures are performed only on women, the need for the
procedures may be traced to male, female, or couple infertility with equal
frequency. Thus, surgical impregnation procedures may be recommended
regardless of the gender of the ill patient.”130 Thus, the court reasoned,
————
127. Id. at 327-38.
128. Id. at 330.
129. Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 344 (2nd Cir. 2003) (citing Newport News,
462 U.S. at 676). Although it found that the district court did not rely on it, the appellate
court also rejected the “couple analysis” (a female-specific exclusion does not constitute sex
discrimination so long as male and female employees and their respective partners received
the same health benefits when considered as a couple), noting the court must focus on the
male and female employees, not the benefits offered to the “couple.” Saks, 316 F.3d at 34445.
130. Id. at 347.

because exclusion of surgical implantation procedures disadvantages male
and female employees equally, the plan does not discriminate on the basis
of sex.
In contrast to the district court, the appellate court held that infertility is
not a “pregnancy related condition” under the plain meaning of Title VII as
modified by the PDA and Johnson Controls, which addresses “childbearing
capacity,” but not “fertility alone.” It reasoned that for a condition to fall
within the PDA’s inclusion of “pregnancy . . . and related medical
conditions”131 as a sex-based characteristic, it must be unique to women.
Infertility is a medical condition that afflicts men and women with equal
frequency, and the exclusion of surgical implantation procedures
disadvantages male and female employees equally. Thus, an infertilitybased distinction is not a sex-based distinction prohibited by Title VII.
b. ERISA and the State Law Claims
The Second Circuit held that ERISA preemption in a benefits-due
action is a waivable affirmative defense, and must be timely raised in the
answer.132 Notwithstanding the employer’s failure to raise ERISA
preemption in its answer, the court remanded the case to the district court
to determine whether the defendant’s motion for summary judgment should
be construed as a motion to amend the answer, and, if so, to rule on that
motion.133
IV. FUTURE CHALLENGES TO
INFERTILITY TREATMENT

THE

EXCLUSION

OF

The decision in Saks II was a disappointment to many, particularly
after the successful use of Title VII to challenge a health plan exclusion in
Erickson.134 But Saks II did not shut the door on using Title VII to
————
131. Id. at 345-46.
132. Id. at 349-50.
133. Id. at 350-51. The court held that although the defendant failed to raise the
affirmative defense of ERISA preemption in its answer, “a district court may still entertain
affirmative defenses at the summary judgment stage in the absence of undue prejudice to the
plaintiff, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the defendant, futility, or undue delay of
the proceedings,” and that under “such circumstances, the district court may construe the
motion for summary judgment as a motion to amend the defendant’s answer.” Id. It seems
likely that if the district court construes the employer’s motion for summary judgment as a
request to amend its answer to raise ERISA preemption, then the remaining state law
contract claim will be preempted. As of the time this Article was completed, no further
action had been reported on the remanded case.
134. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1266.

challenge an employer’s exclusion of infertility treatment from its plan, as
other courts could analyze claims under Title VII differently. In addition,
Saks and other cases suggest that seemingly small changes in the facts
could lead to different results under Title VII and the ADA. Returning to
the example of Jane introduced at the beginning of this Article, this section
outlines the types of challenges to the exclusion of infertility treatment that
plaintiffs may pursue with success in the wake of Saks II.
A. TITLE VII CLAIMS
Title VII offers significant advantages over the ADA for purposes of
challenging the exclusion of infertility treatment. As discussed in Section
II.A. above, a facially neutral policy that simply permits equal access to the
same set of benefits for male and female employees will not pass muster
under Title VII. Instead, employers providing coverage must provide
equally comprehensive coverage for both sexes, and the additional cost of
offering non-discriminatory benefits, if any, is not a defense. 135
1. Disparate Impact: Gender Patterns in Coverage
After receiving the insurance plan’s decision to deny coverage, Jane
spoke to some of her coworkers about the situation, and learned that
several others had requested and received coverage of infertility
treatments. The stories that she heard suggest that the plan covered
treatment of infertility attributable to male factors more frequently than
infertility attributable to female factors.
If true, does this matter? The Second Circuit’s opinion in Saks II
suggests that Jane could state a disparate impact claim based on her plan’s
claim history. It held that “the Plan’s exclusion of surgical impregnation
procedures does not provide male employees with more comprehensive
coverage of infertility treatments than female employees because the
surgical procedures in question are used to treat both male and female
infertility.”136 However, it also noted:
Saks has not offered any evidence from which a reasonable
jury could conclude that the surgical impregnation
procedures required for the treatment of male infertility
————
135. See supra notes 48 to 64 and accompanying text.
136. Saks II, 316 F.3d at 347.

differ from those required for the treatment of female
infertility, or, more importantly, that male infertility is more
frequently treated by other (Plan-approved) means than is
female infertility.137
Accordingly, a plaintiff who can show that her plan has covered
treatment of male infertility more frequently than female infertility may
state a claim under Title VII. Specifically, she may be able to show that
her plan more frequently treats male factors such as no or low sperm
production, blocked passage of sperm, problems with ejaculation, or
immunological disorders that prevent the sperm from penetrating the egg,
than female factors such as ovulation disorders, blocked fallopian tubes, or
structural problems or disorders of the uterus or cervix.138
2. Disparate Impact: Women and Infertility
After receiving the insurance plan’s decision to deny coverage, Jane’s
feelings of rage, grief and depression at the perceived loss of a chance to
conceive, deliver and raise a child intensify. She joins a support group for
people struggling with the disease of infertility. Of the fifteen members of
the support group, only two are men.
Although the Second Circuit recognized that gender patterns in a plan’s
claim history could support a claim of disparate impact on women, it failed
to recognize how a plan's failure to provide comprehensive coverage for
treatment of infertility disparately impacts women.
As discussed in the first section of this Article, infertility is recognized
by the medical community as a disease with devastating emotional effects.
The Second Circuit found that the specific cause of infertility could be
“traced to male, female, or couple infertility with equal frequency,” and
thus exclusion of surgical impregnation procedures performed on women
disadvantaged male and female employees equally. What the Second
Circuit did not consider is the significant evidence suggesting that the
————
137. Id. at 347 n.5.
138. See supra notes 21 to 31 and accompanying text. See also Coverage of
Reproductive Technologies Under Employer-Sponsored Health Care Plans: Proceedings of
the 2004 Annual Meeting, Association of American Law Schools, Joint Program of Sections
on Employee Benefits and Employment Discrimination, 8 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS & EMP. POL’Y
J. 2, 8 (2004) (comments of Professor Helen L. Norton, noting the potential for this type of
claim). Conversely, a male plaintiff may also state a claim if he can show his plan has
covered treatment of female infertility more frequently than male infertility.

emotional and physical toll of infertility disproportionately affects
women.139
One recent survey of the literature on gender differences in
psychological reactions to infertility concluded that in comparison to
infertile men, infertile women report: a higher degree of anxiety,
depression, and loss of self-esteem; lower sexual and marital adjustment;

————
139.

See, e.g., SUSAN LEWIS COOPER & ELLEN SARASOHN GLAZER, CHOOSING
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: SOCIAL, EMOTIONAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 18 (1998)
(“The observation that women and men experience infertility in different ways is something
that has long been known by infertile couples and their caregivers. . . [In studies] [w]omen
have been found to experience significantly more psychological distress than do their
partners, especially in the areas of depression, anxiety, cognitive disturbance and
hostility.”); Anna Hjelmstedt et al., Gender Differences in Psychological Reactions to
Infertility Among Couples Seeking IVF- and ICSI-Treatment, 78 ACTA OBSTETRICIA ET
GYNECOLOGICA SCANDINAVICA 42, 44-46 (1999) (noting the different psychological impact
infertility has on women and men); John Wright et al., Psychosocial Distress and Infertility:
Men and Women Respond Differently, 55 FERTILITY & STERILITY 100 (1991) (“Consistent
with previous research, infertile women showed higher distress than their partners on a
global measure of psychiatric symptoms and subscales of anxiety, depression, hostility, and
cognitive disturbances, as well as on measured of stress and self-esteem.”); Frank M.
Andrews et al., Stress from Infertility, Marriage Factors, and Subjective Well-Being of
Wives and Husbands, 32 J.HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV., 238, 238 (1991) (finding that “negative
effects on life quality are stronger for wives than for husbands”); Christopher R. Newton et
al., Psychological Assessment and Follow-Up After In Vitro Fertilization: Assessing the
Impact of Failure, 54 FERTILITY & STERILITY 879, 879 (1990) (after a failed cycle of IVF,
women and men showed significant increases in anxiety and depressive symptoms, and
prevalence of mild and moderate depression increased substantially, particularly among
women); Ellen W. Freeman et al., Psychological Evaluation and Support in a Program of In
Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, 43 FERTILITY & STERILITY 48, 50 (1985) (noting
that 49% of women and 15% of men being treatment for infertility described the experience
as the “most upsetting experience in their lives”); Ann Lalos et al., A Psychosocial
Characterization of Infertile Couples for Surgical Treatment of the Female, 4 J.
PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 83, 83 (1985) (a Swedish study finding that
infertility has severe emotional and social effects, and that women openly admitted more
symptoms such as grief, depression guilt, feelings of inferiority and isolation that their male
partners). But see Robert D. Nachtigall et al., The Effects of Gender-Specific Diagnosis on
Men’s and Women’s Response to Infertility, 57 FERTILITY & STERILITY 113, 113 (1992)
(finding significant differences in the emotional response to infertility between women and
men, and noting that men’s response more closely approximates that of women if the
infertility has been attributed to a male factor); Aila Collins et al., Perceptions of Infertility
and Treatment Stress in Females as Compared with Males entering In Vitro Fertilization
Treatment, 92 FERTILITY & STERILITY 350, 350 (1992) (although women reported more
stress entering into IVF treatment, the men appeared to be as psychologically affected by
infertility as women).

and more feelings of guilt, inferiority and isolation. 140 The authors also
noted that “[t]he negative effects of infertility on quality of life have been
shown to be stronger for infertile women compared to infertile men.”141
While there could be many reasons for the disparity in reactions to
infertility between women and men,142 the evidence certainly suggests that
the disease of infertility, in particular its psychological effects,
disproportionately affects women.
Women may also experience distinct and disparate health effects as a
result of infertility. For example, according to the National Cancer
Institute, women who have never been pregnant have a greater risk of
developing endometrial143 or ovarian cancer,144 while women who have
more than one child have a decreased risk of developing breast cancer.145
Another recent study suggests that breast-feeding after childbirth may
reduce a woman’s risk of developing rheumatoid arthritis.146
Accordingly, if a plaintiff musters the literature to support her claim
that infertility disproportionately affects women in terms of emotional
health, physical health, or both, she could then argue that the exclusion of
certain treatments for infertility has a disparate impact on female
employees that should be recognized under Title VII.

3. Employee’s Marital Status
————
140. See generally Hjelmstedt et al., supra note 139 (reviewing the literature); See also
Domar et al., supra note 20 (reporting that infertile women being treated by an infertility
specialist experience twice the prevalence of depression than healthy women).
141. Hjelmstedt et al., supra note 139, at 42.
142. Id. (women may be more likely to report greater feelings of anxiety, men may
have different coping mechanisms, etc.). See also Nachtigall et al., supra note 139 (finding
significant differences in the emotional response to infertility between women and men, and
noting that men’s response more closely approximates that of women if the infertility has
been attributed to a male factor).
143. National Cancer Institute, U.S. National Institutes of Health, Ovarian Cancer
(PDQ): Prevention, available at
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/pdq/prevention/ovarian/Patient/page2 (last visited Apr.
9, 2005).
144. National Cancer Institute, U.S. National Institutes of Health, Endometrial Cancer
(PDQ): Prevention, available at
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/pdq/prevention/ovarian/Patient/page2 (last visited Apr.
9, 2005).
145. National Cancer Institute, U.S. National Institutes of Health, Pregnancy and
Breast Cancer Risk, at http://cis.nci.nih.gov/fact/3_77.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2005).
146. Elizabeth W. Karlson et al., Do Breast-feeding and other Reproductive Factors
Influence Future Risk of Rheumatoid Arthritis?: Results from the Nurses’ Health Study, 50
ARTHRITIS & RHEUMATISM 3458, 3458-67 (2004) (finding that women who breastfeed have
a lower risk of developing rheumatoid arthritis).

Jane is seeking treatment for infertility because she and her partner,
Julia, wish to raise a child together. In the alternative, Jane is single and
heterosexual, and wishes to have a child.
Regardless of her sexual orientation, does Jane’s marital status affect
the scope of her protection under Title VII? Jane may be able to state a
disparate impact claim based on the lingering “couple analysis.” The
appellate court in Saks II found that because exclusion of surgical
implantation procedures disadvantages male and female employees
equally, the plan does not discriminate on the basis of sex.147 In so holding,
it explicitly rejected the lower court’s “couple analysis,” under which a
female-specific exclusion would not constitute sex discrimination so long
as male and female employees and their respective partners received the
same health benefits when considered as a couple.148 The appellate court
explained that the lower court had misapplied the Supreme Court’s holding
in Newport News:
The [Supreme Court], therefore, focused on whether male
and female employees received equal coverage under their
health benefits packages. It did not hold, as Franklin Covey
seems to suggest, that an across-the-board female–specific
exclusion would pass muster under Title VII or the ADA, so
long as all couples received the same benefits.149
However, the appellate court appeared to endorse another form of
“couple analysis” in evaluating the level of coverage for male and female
employees: “in the instant case, we engaged in a couple analysis to the
extent that we evaluate whether the exclusion of surgical impregnation
procedures results in less comprehensive benefits for female employees.”150
————
147. Saks II, 316 F.3d at 347.
148. Id. at 344. As an illustration of the district court's analysis, imagine that the Jane
introduced at the beginning of the Article has a coworker, John, who is married and seeking
coverage of infertility treatment for himself, his wife, or both. Jane and John's plan excludes
infertility treatments performed on women only. Under the district court's analysis, the plan
is not discriminatory because both Jane and John are denied coverage of the same treatments
performed on women -- Jane is denied coverage for treatments performed on herself, and
John is denied coverage for treatments performed on his wife.
149. Id. at 344-45 (citations omitted).
150. Id. at 345 n.2 (citations omitted). As the focus is on the employee, the spousebeneficiary may not have standing to raise a Title VII claim. See generally Nicol v.
Imagematrix, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 802 (E.D.Va. 1991); Niemeier v. Tri-State Fire Prot. Dist.,

The appellate court went on to hold that Franklin Covey’s plan did not
violate Title VII because it did not result in a less comprehensive benefit
package for female employees.151
The problem with the Second Circuit’s analysis is that it still assumes a
couple. Indeed, the court even suggested how this “couple analysis” might
be exploited:
With respect to unmarried employees, the Plan would appear
to cover only those infertility treatments that are required to
treat the infertility of the employee, not the employee’s
partner, and that are performed directly on the employee
himself or herself. Hence, in these circumstances, by
excluding certain infertility treatments that are performed on
women only, an argument can be made that the Plan denies
coverage for a subset of infertility treatments available to
unmarried female employees while covering all infertility
treatments available to unmarried male employees.152
Therefore, it appears that an unmarried infertile female employee may
have a viable PDA or Title VII claim because she could not access certain
infertility treatments that are performed on women only, while an
unmarried infertile male employee could access the unrestricted benefits
available without any such exclusion.153 This is a notable inversion of the
heterosexual and marriage-based norms traditionally reflected in diagnosis,
treatment and legal criteria for infertility treatment.154
The Second Circuit’s analysis also appears to assume that the employee
and his or her spouse are both covered under the employee’s health care
plan. This may not be a sound assumption, as according to recent news
No. 99C7391, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12621 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2000). At least one court
has allowed the employee to seek reimbursement for costs associated with treating the
spouse-beneficiary. Cwiak v. Flint Ink Corp., 186 F.R.D. 494, 496 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (male
employee has standing to pursue claims under the ADA and the PDA for employer health
plans failure to cover expenses incurred in treatment of his wife’s infertility).
151. Saks II, 316 F.3d at 349.
152. Id. at 347-48 n.6.
153. Id.; see ASRM Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 11-12.
154. See, e.g., Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Infertile, the Too Fertile, and the Dysfertile, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 1007, 1027-33 (1996) (discussing heterosexual and marriage-based norms in
diagnosis and treatment criteria). There have been news reports that couples are marrying in
order to secure health insurance benefits. See Daniel Costello, Saying “I Do” for a Health
Plan: With Medical Costs Rising, Gaining Access to Benefits is Becoming a Factor in Some
Couples’ Decisions to Wed, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 2004, at F1. If unmarried female
employees do in fact have a relatively stronger Title VII or PDA claim as suggested above,
this could lead to the opposite result—divorcing to secure coverage for infertility treatment.

reports, a few large employers are eliminating health care benefits for
employees' spouses, or using financial penalties to discourage such
coverage in order to lower overall health costs.155
B. ADA CLAIMS
The ADA appears to be less helpful than Title VII for purposes of
challenging the exclusion of infertility treatment due to the less demanding
“equal access” standard, the broad safe harbor provision, and a narrow
definition of subterfuge.156 Notwithstanding these issues, what if Saks
appealed the ADA claim? At first blush, it appears that the result would be
the same, as the district court used the accepted “equal access” standard to
However,
evaluate non-discriminatory benefits under the ADA.157
comparison of Saks with other cases suggests that seemingly small changes
in the facts could lead to different results under the ADA.

1. Standing and the Origin of the Condition

————
155. Kris Hundley, Companies Squeeze Spouses Out to Save Health Care Costs, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 30, 2004, at 1A (reporting that employers such as Gannett,
Verizon and Knight-Ridder recently have implemented such policies).
156. See supra notes 65 to 79 and accompanying text.
157. Ms. Saks could have brought a claim under Title III of the ADA, challenging the
exclusion as discrimination in the public accommodation of health insurance. Title III of
the ADA prohibits disability-based discrimination by private entities “in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of
any place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2004). A few Circuits have
held that a provider of health insurance coverage can be liable as a “public accommodation”
under this Title. See Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1998); Conners
v. Me. Med. Ctr., 42 F. Supp. 2d 34, 46 (D. Me. 1999); Rogers v. Dep’t of Health and Envtl.
Control, 985 F. Supp. 635, 637-38 (D.S.C. 1997). However, other circuits have found that
Title III does not reach the content of privately-offered health insurance coverage. See
Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000); Ford v.
Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
121 F.3d 1006, 1012 (6th Cir. 1997). Analysis of health insurance as a public
accommodation is beyond the scope of this Article.

When Jane sought treatment for her condition, her doctor opined that
her infertility was due to her age, rather than a specific illness or disease.
Does the cause of Jane’s condition matter? In the Krauel case
discussed above, the Eighth Circuit held that an exclusion of infertility
treatment was not a disability–based distinction under the ADA because it
applied to infertility due to all causes, and not just ADA-recognized
impairments.158 The court reasoned:
[T]he Plan's infertility exclusion applies equally to all
individuals, in that no one participating in the Plan receives
coverage for treatment of infertility problems. For example,
the Plan exclusion bars coverage for infertility caused by
age, a condition which is not recognized as a disability under
the ADA, and for infertility caused by ovarian cancer, which
is defined as a disability under the ADA. Therefore, the
District Court properly held that the Plan is not a disabilitybased distinction in violation of the ADA.159
Although Krauel’s rejection of reproduction as a major life activity was
abrogated by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bragdon, it is not clear that
Krauel’s emphasis on the origin of the infertility was similarly abrogated.
Indeed, the lower court in Saks I noted that infertility arising from “natural
aging process, rather than from some disease or defect, is not a ‘disability’
within the meaning of the ADA.”160
Given the numerous and often interacting causes of infertility—
including the fact that in approximately twenty percent of the cases the
cause is never known161—proving a medical cause or origin may be a
significant factual hurdle for the plaintiff.162 For example, in the course of
treatment of her infertility, Ms. Saks’s doctors attributed the inability of
Ms. Saks and her husband to conceive first to polycystic ovarian syndrome,
then unknown causes, and finally a hormonal imbalance and ovulatory
————
158. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677-78 (8th Cir. 1996).
159. Id. at 678.
160. Saks I, 117 F. Supp. 2d. at 326.
161. ASRM, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 1.
162. Plaintiff has the burden of establishing standing under the ADA as an essential
element of her claim. See. e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 494 (1999)
(dismissing petitioner’s complaint for failure to state a claim because they did not establish
that they are actually disabled or “regarded as” disabled).

disorder.163 Although the medical origin of Ms. Saks's infertility was not
challenged,164 it is unclear if Ms. Saks could have marshaled the medical
evidence to demonstrate that her infertility arose from a disease or physical
defect if she had been required to do so.
A pair of pre-Bragdon cases provides some guidance on this issue. In
Zatarain v. WDSU-Television Inc.,165 an employee brought suit under the
ADA claiming that her employer rejected reasonable accommodations to
her work schedule to allow her to pursue infertility treatment. No specific
medical cause for her infertility was established. Her employer argued,
among other things, that her infertility was not an impairment because it
was likely caused by her age (she was approaching 40) or job stress.166 The
court denied the summary judgment for the employer on that basis because
the employee had offered expert testimony sufficient to support a finding
that she suffered from a disorder of the reproductive system apart from age
and stress.167 In addition, in Pacourek v. Inland Steel Company,168 the
court outright rejected the requirement of medical cause. In that case, an
employee brought suit under the ADA claiming that she was fired for
taking time off for infertility treatment. The cause of her infertility was
medically unexplained.169 Her employer argued, among other things, that
she lacked standing because unexplained infertility is not an impairment
covered by the ADA. The district court rejected that argument and held that
“it does not matter whether the infertility is explained or not. The ADA
and regulations under it are simply devoid of any requirement that a
physiological disorder or condition have a scientific name or known
etiology.” 170 Courts have also rejected the requirement of specific medical
cause or impairment post-Bragdon. For example, in LaPorta v. Wal-Mart
Stores Inc.,171 the employee’s physician stated that she was infertile, but
could not identify a specific cause for her infertility. Her employer
suggested that because it might arise from “a physiological problem of the
————
163. Saks I, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 321-22.
164. Id. at 320 n.1. Although for the purposes of its motion for summary judgment her
employer did not dispute that her infertility was an impairment that substantially limited her
ability to reproduce, the court noted, “it appears that certain issues regarding Saks’ infertility
and her need for chemical and/or surgical intervention to become pregnant would be
disputed if this case were going to trial.” Id.
165. Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. La. 1995).
166. Id. at 243.
167. Id.
168. 916 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
169. Id. at 799.
170. Id. at 801.
171. 163 F. Supp.2d 758 (W.D.Mich. 2001).

[husband]” or “environmental factors and lifestyle habits,” she had not
demonstrated that she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA.172 The
district court rejected this argument, finding that a reasonable jury could
find that the plaintiff was infertile based on the doctor’s affidavit.
Therefore, a plaintiff may need to be prepared to demonstrate the origin
or medical cause of the infertility in order to establish that it arises from an
impairment recognized under the ADA, although lack of a medical basis to
do so should not bar her claim.
2. Standing and Mitigation of the Condition
After Jane discovered that the health insurance provided through her
work covered some treatments, but excluded surgical impregnation
procedures, she went ahead with IVF and was able to conceive. She then
sought reimbursement from the health plan.
Do successful results affect Jane’s ability to seek reimbursement for
infertility treatment? The defendants in Saks argued—albeit in a
footnote—that infertility cannot be a disability within the meaning of the
ADA because it is a correctable condition,173 relying upon Murphy v.
United Parcel Service174 and Sutton v. United Airlines.175
Together with Albertsons v. Kirkenburg,176 Murphy and Sutton
comprise the Supreme Court’s 1999 “Sutton trilogy” on standing. In each
of these cases, the Court held that the ADA requires an individualized
consideration of the plaintiff’s undisputed impairment, taking into account
any medical treatment, corrective devices and other mitigating measures.177
Following these cases, courts have found impairments such as diabetes,178
————
172. Id. at 764 (quotations omitted). Although not reached in LaPorta, the question of
whether an employee can state a claim if the source of the infertility is her partner (and
therefore she has no identifiable impairment herself) is an interesting one. At least one court
has allowed the employee to seek reimbursement for costs associated with treating the
spouse-beneficiary. See Cwiak v. Flint Ink Corp., 186 F.R.D. 494, 496 (male employee has
standing to pursue claims under the ADA and the PDA for employer health plan’s failure to
cover expenses incurred in treatment of his wife’s infertility).
173. 117 F. Supp. 2d at 325.
174. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
175. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
176. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
177. For a critique of the Sutton Trilogy see Elizabeth A. Pendo, Substantially Limited
Justice?: The Possibilities and Limits of a New Rawlsian Analysis of Disability-Based
Discrimination, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 225 (2003).
178. Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720, reh’g en banc denied (8th Cir. 2002)
(employee with diabetes not disabled -- and therefore could not prevail on his claim that he

asthma179 and depression180 to be correctable or amenable to mitigation, and
therefore not disabilities within the meaning of the ADA in those cases.
The district court in Saks, however, rejected this argument as illadvised as applied to infertility:
[I]n the opinion of this Court, the Supreme Court did not
intend to rule that no disease or organic defect can qualify as
an ADA disability as long as some treatment can ameliorate
its impact in some percentage of persons afflicted, however
small that percentage may be. Indeed, I think it highly likely
that courts will, over time, develop a spectrum of “disability”
along which various diseases will fall, depending on some
case-by-case analysis of their seriousness, their susceptibility
to treatment, the rate at which treatment succeeds in curing
them altogether or lessening their impact, and the impact of
available treatments on the plaintiff at bar . . .. Whether the
availability of draconian regiments that avoid the
consequences of infertility in a small percentage of
individuals places this particular impairment closer to the
Murphy/Sutton
end
of
the
spectrum
or
the
diabetes/cancer/kidney failure end could not possibly be
determined on the present record. But the position espoused
by defendants is not so self-evident (as demonstrated by the
fact that they relegate this argument to a footnote) that I
would dismiss on Murphy/Sutton grounds at this juncture.181
One year later, the Michigan district court in LaPorta reached a similar
conclusion. In that case, plaintiff brought an action under the ADA, Title
VII and state laws challenging her termination after her employer failed to
was unlawfully terminated for closing pharmacy to take lunch breaks for maintaining his
health -- because diabetes currently corrected with medication).
179. Tangires v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D. Md. 2000), aff'd, 230
F.3d 1354 (4th Cir. 2000) (Plaintiff's asthma found not substantially limiting because it was
correctable by medication, even though plaintiff refused to take the medication. Plaintiff's
doctor testified that her asthma was slow to clear because she refused to comply with his
recommendations and was reluctant to take steroid drugs).
180. Krocka v. Chicago, 203 F.3d 507 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding jury's finding that
employee's depression was not substantially limiting because he exhibited no symptoms
when taking medication and was able to perform his job adequately); Spades v. City of
Walnut Ridge, 186 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 1999) (employee’s depression was being treated with
medication that allowed him to function “without limitation”).
181. Saks I, 117 F. Supp.2d at 325-26.

accommodate her request for medical leave to receive treatment for
infertility.182 Her employer argued, among other things, that plaintiff
lacked standing to bring the action because her infertility was not a
disability within the meaning of the ADA. Relying upon the Sutton trilogy,
defendant argued, “[P]laintiff’s eventual success in becoming pregnant
through artificial insemination in 1998 renders it ‘impossible’ to find that
her condition of infertility substantially limited her in the major life activity
of reproduction.”183 The court rejected defendant’s argument: “[u]nlike the
plaintiffs in Sutton and Albertsons, Ms. LaPorta is not asking the court to
consider her situation in an uncorrected state. To the contrary, she points to
the need for accommodation arising from the corrective measures
themselves.” 184 Thus, the court recognized that defendant’s argument
would create a painful “Catch-22” for the plaintiff—her infertility is an
impairment that was ultimately correctable through expensive and intrusive
treatment, but her employer can refuse to accommodate her requests for
medical leave to pursue such treatment because the treatments were
ultimately successful.185
The courts in both La Porta and Saks also recognized that a rule under
which an impairment that is subject to any amelioration—no matter how
onerous—would not qualify as a disability under the ADA was unwise, and
in the case of infertility conflates the distinct concepts of infertility and
sterility.186 Such an approach is also directly contrary to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bragdon, which notes that the ADA “addresses
substantial limitation on major life activities, not utter inabilities.”187
Indeed, other courts have found that impairments such as hearing loss,188
————
182. 163 F. Supp. 2d at 760. As the LaPorta case illustrates, courts have found that
infertile employees enjoy more ADA protection for requests for changes to work schedules,
time off for treatment, and other “reasonable accommodations” in the workplace than for
coverage of infertility treatments under their employer’s health plan. See, e.g. Pacourek v.
Inland Steel Co., Inc., 916 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. Ill 1996).
183. Laporta, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 765.
184. Id. at 766.
185. Id.; see also Pendo, supra note 177, at 261-62 (discussing the “Catch 22” created
by the Sutton trilogy).
186. LaPorta, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 764 (recognizing that infertility as “a diminished
ability to become pregnant by natural means,” not the “complete inability to produce
offspring.”)
187. 524 U.S. at 639. The Court also explicitly noted, “[W]hen significant limitations
result from the impairment, the definition is met even if the difficulties are not
insurmountable.” Id. at 639.
188. See Wilson v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 195 F. Supp. 2d 419, 428-29 (W.D.N.Y.
2002) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment because plaintiff's hearing loss,
although mitigated by hearing aids, was permanent and significantly below the average
person's hearing, and plaintiff had difficulties using the hearing aids).

epilepsy,189 depression190 and asthma191 that can be corrected or mitigated
may still constitute disabilities within the meaning of the ADA where the
mitigation was not complete, or itself resulted in substantial limitation of a
major life activity.
Accordingly, although it may continue to be raised by defendants, the
fact that infertility can be treated, sometimes successfully, should not bar a
plaintiff’s challenge to the exclusion of infertility treatment under the
ADA.
3. Self-Funded versus Insured Plans
Although Jane’s insurance card bears the name of a well-known
insurance company, she recently discovered that her health plan is selffunded. A Human Resources representative told her that this means her
employer assumes all or part of the risk of paying for the benefits instead of
purchasing a health care coverage policy from an insurance company.
Does the funding of her plan affect her protections under the ADA? As
discussed in Section I.B. above, self-insured plans are exempted from state
regulation as a result of ERISA’s preemption analysis, and therefore are
subject to only the most minimal antidiscrimination requirements under the
ADA.192
A number of scholars analyzed the scope of ADA protection for
participants in self-funded health plans in the early 1990s, particularly after
the decision in McGann v. H & H Music Co.,193 upholding under ERISA an
employer’s cap on health insurance benefits for the treatment of persons
with AIDS.194 Based on two early cases,195 some scholars anticipated a
more protective role for the ADA in the context of employer-sponsored
health insurance, even for self-funded plans.196 Despite the relative
optimism of these predictions, courts subsequently held that disabilitybased distinctions in bona fide, ERISA-regulated, self-funded plans will be
————
189. Otting v. J.C. Penney Co., 223 F.3d 704, 711 (8th Cir. 2000) (denying
defendant’s motion for summary judgment because despite mitigating effects of plaintiff's
medication, plaintiff's epilepsy was not fully under control).
190. Maxwell v. GTE Wireless Serv. Corp., 121 F. Supp. 2d 649, 654 (N.D. Ohio
2000) (denying motion for summary judgment in part because of genuine issues of material
fact as to whether employee’s depression, even when treated with medication and
counseling, interfered with the major life activities of working).
191. Saunders v. Baltimore County, 163 F. Supp. 2d 564, 568 (D. Md. 2001) (finding
that employee’s asthma was an impairment because he experiences severe asthma attacks
despite medications and other treatments).
192. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.

upheld—whether or not they are based on sound actuarial analysis—unless
the distinctions can be shown to be subterfuge for discrimination.197
Although it is not clear that employers choose self-funding solely to
avoid state law mandates or the protections of the ADA,198 it remains true
193. 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991).
194. See John A. English, Self-insured Group Medical Plans: A Search for Protection
of Benefits, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 749 (1993); Patrick Morgan, Applicability of ADA NonDiscrimination Principles to Self-Insured Health Plans: Do “AIDS Caps” Violate the
Law?, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 221 (1994); Dion A. Sullivan, ERISA, the ADA,
and AIDS: Fixing Self-Insured Health Plans with Carparts, 7 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 423 (1996); Nancy R. Mansfield et al., Insurance Caps on AIDS-Related Healthcare
Costs: Will the ADA Fill the Gap Created by ERISA?, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 601 (1998).
195. Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Donahey, No. 93 CIV. 1154, 1993
WL 944580, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1993) (opining that a self-funded plan’s benefit cap
for a specific disability would violate the ADA unless actuarially justified); Carparts
Distribution Ctr. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Asso. of New England, 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994)
(trade association and trust administering health plan can be considered a public
accommodation under Title III of ADA for purposes of challenging a cap on benefits for
illnesses relating to AIDS). The EEOCs Interim Guidance also lent support to a broader
interpretation of the ADA’s protections with respect to employer health plans. EEOC
Interim Guidance, supra note 67.
196. See Kevin Caster, The Future of Self-Funded Health Plans, 79 IOWA L. REV. 413
(1994) (ADA could provide meaningful protection for participants in self-funded plans if
the courts reject the ADEA’s definition of subterfuge); John E. Estes, Employee Benefits or
Employer “Subterfuge”: The Americans with Disabilities Act’s Prohibition Against
Discrimination in Health Plans, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 85, 100 (1994) (employers
should be required to show that cost justification itself is not a subterfuge for
discrimination); Sullivan, supra note 195, at 423; Nancy R. Mansfield, Evolving Limitations
on Coverage for AIDS: Implications for Health Insurers and Employers Under the ADA
and ERISA, 35 TORT & INS. L. J. 117 n.85 (1999) (cases such as Mason Tenders and
Carparts suggests that the ADA may eliminate ERISA’s loophole for self-funded plans, so
that insured and self-funded plans may have to provide sound actual support when singling
out a disability for a post-claim cap.). Other early analyses were less optimistic. See
English, supra note 195, at 764-66 (1993) (Because of safe harbor, the only ADA limit on
self-funded plans is “subterfuge” which is not defined by the statute. If ADEA definition is
used (McMann), this protection will be quite limited.); Morgan, supra note 195, at 251
(1994) (predicting the courts would reject the EEOC’s assertion that the ADA’s antidiscrimination and provision and risk classification principles apply to self-funded plans).
197. See, e.g., Saks I, 117 F. Supp. 2d. 318, aff’d 316 F.3d 337, 341 (2d Cir. 2003);
Leonard, 199 F.3d at 104; Henzel, 285 F. Supp. 2d at 279.
198. One survey indicates that employers choose self-funded health insurance benefits
in order to avoid conflicts in insurance laws across the states. LeAnne DeFrancesco, State
Variation in Insurance Laws a Major Driver of Employers’ Self-Insurance Decisions,
Findings Brief (Academy Health / Changes in Health Care Financing & Organization), Vol.
VII, No. 1 Feb. 2004, available at http://www.hcfo.net/pdf/findings0204.pdf; see also
MARTHA PRIDDY PATTERSON & DEREK LISTON, ANALYSIS OF THE NUMBER OF WORKERS
COVERED BY SELF-INSURED HEALTH PLANS UNDER THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT OF 1974–1993 AND 1995 (1996) (noting one advantage to a self-funded plan
is health plan designs can be applied on a nation-wide basis; the employee does not have to

that employees who participate in self-funded plans will continue to enjoy
significantly less protection under the ADA than those who participate in
insured plans. The same is not true for employees pursing a claim under
Title VII, in which case the funding status of the health plan is not relevant.
Indeed, the plan at issue in Erickson was self-funded. 199
The exception for self-funded plans is increasingly significant. The
number of self-funded plans has increased dramatically since ERISA’s
passage in 1974.200 As of 2003, the majority of covered workers are in a
plan that is completely or partially self-funded.201 While large employers
have always been the most likely to self-fund health benefit plans,202 news
reports indicate that the trend toward self-funding will spread to small and
mid-size employers as the cost of health care continues to rise.203
Moreover, like Jane, many employees may not be aware that their health
plans are self-funded, as employers may contract with a traditional
insurance carrier or other third-party administrator to administer the plan
on a day-to-day basis.204
Accordingly, a plaintiff using the ADA to challenge exclusions in her
employer-sponsored plan will be in a significantly better position if her
plan is insured, rather than self-funded.
4. Subterfuge and the Timing of the Exclusion
change benefits when he or she changes job locations with the employer). In addition, there
is some evidence that self-funded and insured plans cost similar amounts and provide
similar benefits. Gabel et al., supra note 101.
199. 141 F. Supp. 2d. at 1268 n.1.
200. See, e.g., Jensen & Gabel, supra note 78 (reporting that between 1981 and 1985,
the percentage of employees in mid- to large-size firms covered by self-insurance grew from
25% to 42%). See also PATTERSON & LISTON, supra note 198, at 6 (noting that the
percentage of workers enrolled in a fully or partially self-funded plan dropped from 60 to
51% between 1993 and 1995, due in part to the shift toward insured managed care plans,
particularly by smaller employers. However “[a]s various types of managed care plans
begin moving toward shifting financial risk to the employer, the trend toward increasing
self-insurance, and the ERISA preemption of state laws afforded by self-insurance, may
begin growing again.”).
201. Kaiser Family Foundation, supra note 78, at 121-29 (reporting that in 2003, 52%
of covered workers were in a plan that is completely or partially self-insured) available at
http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/20672_1.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2005).
202. See id. at 123-29. “The likelihood that an employer self-insures is highly related
to the size of the firm. Ten percent of covered workers in all small firms (3-199 workers) are
in self-insured plans, compared to 50% of workers in mid-size firms (200-999 workers) and
79% of workers in jumbo firms (5,000 or more workers).” Id. at 124.
203. See Christopher Windham, Self-Insurance Plans Gain as Premiums Jump, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 30, 2003, at B2.
204. Jensen & Gabel, supra note 78.

Jane looks through her old health insurance booklets, and discovers
that her employer instituted the exclusion of surgical impregnation
procedures in 1995. In the alternative, she discovers that her employer
instituted the exclusion in 1985.
As discussed above, disability-based distinctions in bona fide, ERISAregulated, self-funded plans will be upheld—whether or not they are based
on sound actuarial analysis—unless the distinctions can be shown to be
subterfuge for discrimination. What is a “subterfuge” for discrimination in
this context, and does the date of the exclusion determine whether or not
the exclusion is a subterfuge for discrimination?
In its 1993 Interim Guidance, the EEOC defined subterfuge as
disability-based disparate treatment in an employee benefit plan that is not
justified by “sound actuarial principles or related to actual or reasonably
anticipated experience.”205 It specifically rejected the definition of
subterfuge developed by the Supreme Court in Public Employees
Retirement System v. Betts206 under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (“ADEA”),207 which held that a plan adopted prior to the
enactment of the statute could not be a subterfuge to avoid the purposes of
the statute.208 It also rejected Betts’s requirement that an ADEA plaintiff
show the employer’s specific intent to discriminate in a non-fringe aspect
of the employment relationship as inapplicable to the ADA.209

————
205. EEOC Interim Guidance, supra note 67.
206. 492 U.S. 158 (1989), superseded by statute as stated in, Gen. Dynamics Land
Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
207. 29 U.S.C. § 621.
208. EEOC Interim Guidance, supra note 67, at 10.
209. Id. at 10. Indeed, several scholars argued that the courts would or should adopt
the EEOC’s definition of subterfuge. Caster, supra note 196 (ADA could provide
meaningful protection for participants in self-funded plans if the courts reject the ADEA’s
definition of subterfuge); Estes, supra note 196 (the ADEA’s narrow, intent-based definition
of subterfuge should not apply to the ADA. Moreover, employers should be required to
show that cost justification itself is not a subterfuge for discrimination); Sullivan, supra note
195; Mansfield, supra note 196 (although the Circuits are not in agreement, cases such as
Mason Tenders & Carparts suggests that the ADA may eliminate ERISA’s loophole for
self-funded plans, so that insured and self-funded plans may have to provide sound actual
support when singling out a disability for a post-claim cap.). Other early analyses were less
optimistic. See English, supra note 195 (Because of safe harbor, the only ADA limit on
self-funded plans is “subterfuge” which is not defined by the statute. If ADEA definition is
used (McMann), this protection will be quite limited); Morgan, supra note 195, at 251
(predicting the courts would reject the EEOC’s assertion that the ADA’s anti-discrimination
and provision and risk classification principles apply to self-funded plans).

However, beginning in 1996, courts began to reject the EEOC’s
definition, and to adopt the Betts definition of subterfuge in ADA cases.210
These cases define subterfuge as “a scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice of
evasion,” that includes “a specific intent to circumvent or evade a statutory
purpose.”211 Under this analysis, it does matter when the challenged
exclusion was adopted, because exclusions adopted prior to 1992, the date
Title I of the ADA became effective for employers with 25 or more
employees,212 cannot be considered a subterfuge to avoid the ADA’s
prohibition of disability-based discrimination.
Accordingly, it appears that only plaintiffs who can establish that at
some point after 1992, their employers planned to exclude treatments for
infertility with the specific intent to evade the ADA can demonstrate that
the exclusion is a subterfuge for discrimination.
V. RECOGNIZING THE EXCLUSIONS AS DISCRIMINATION:
THE POLICY CONTEXT
There is an old saw in political science that difficult conditions become
problems only when people come to see them as amenable to human action.
Until then, difficulties remain embedded in the realm of nature, accident,
and fate – a realm where there is no choice about what happens to us. The
conversion of difficulties into problems is said to be the sine qua non of
political rebellion, legal disputes, interest-group mobilization, and of
moving policy problems onto the public agenda.213
Currently, comprehensive coverage of treatments for infertility appears
to be the exception rather than the rule in employer plans,214 and voluntary
expansion of benefits in this area seem unlikely in the face of continued
————
210. See, e.g., Aramark Corp., 208 F.3d. 266 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Ford, 145 F.3d 601 (3d
Cir. 1998); cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999); Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1094 (1997); Leonard F, 199 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1999); Conner
v. Colony Lake Lure, No. 4:97CV01, 1997 WL 816511 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 4, 1997).
211. Aramark Corp., 208 F.3d at 269 (citing Betts, 492 U.S. at 167 (quoting McMann,
434 U.S. at 203)).
212. The ADA was signed by President George Bush in 1990, but Title I did not
become effective until July 26, 1992 for employers with 25 or more employees. 42
U.S.C.A. § 12101, S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 2 (1989).
213. Deborah Stone, Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas, 104 POL.
SCI. Q. 281, 281 (1989).
214. ASRM Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 11-12; see also Sato, supra note 4, at 1972000.

increases in group health insurance premiums.215 The analysis above
shows that some plaintiffs may be able to use claims of sex discrimination,
disability discrimination, or both to secure equitable treatment of infertility.
Equitable coverage is of course distinct from comprehensive coverage –
under the former, an employer could lawfully exclude all treatment of
infertility, or place limitations on coverage based on factors other than sex
or disability. The deeper question is whether employers should be required
to provide comprehensive infertility treatments. This section examines the
public policy arguments for and against the comprehensive coverage of
infertility treatment, and argues for the transformation of the “difficulty” of
infertility exclusions into a “problem” that should be recognized under the
law.
A. INFERTILITY IS STILL A “WOMAN’S PROBLEM”
Jane and her husband, John, finally revealed their shared struggle to
have a child with their family. Although they explained that the infertility
was due to low sperm production, both Jane and John's family members
offered support, sympathy and treatment advice primarily to Jane, and saw
the issue as one primarily affecting Jane.
As discussed above, the available evidence suggests that women
experiencing the disease of infertility are disproportionately affected by its
devastating psychological impact. Although infertility is medically defined
————
215. Vernon Smith et al., Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured,
Medicaid Spending Growth, Results from 2002 Survey, at 3, 9 (Sept. 2002) available at
http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/13512_1.pdf (rates rose by 12.7% in 2002 -- the
largest increase since 1990); Bradley C. Strunk et al., Tracking Health Care Costs: Growth
Accelerates
Again
in
2001,
available
at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hltaff.w2.299v1/DCI
(“premiums
for
employment-based insurance increased 12.7 percent from 2001 to 2002…the largest
increase
in
premiums
since
1990.”).
See
Hewitt
Association
at
http://was4.hewitt.com/hewitt/resource/newsroom/pressrel/2003/06-23-03.htm (forecasting
average rate increases of 17.7% for 2004); Aon Spring 2003 Health Care Trend Survey, at
http://www.aon.com/about/publications/pdf/issues/healthcaresurvey_29may03.pdf
(forecasting average health plan rate increases of 15.7% to 17.2% for 2004); Press Release,
Hewitt Health Assocs., HMO Rates Continue Double-Digit Increases, But Begin to
Moderate (June 3, 2004), available at
http://was4.hewitt.com/hewitt/resource/newsroom/pressrel/2004/06-03-04.htm
(health
insurers will seek premium increases for large employers averaging 13.7 percent in 2005);
Aon Consulting, Aon Spring 2003 Health Care Trend Survey, available at
http://www.aon.com/about/publications/pdf/issues/healthcaresurvey_29may03.pdf (health
care plan costs will rise between 14.4 percent and 17.2 percent, depending upon type of plan
and including of prescription drug coverage).

as applying to a (heterosexual) couple, the emotional and health care
burden falls more heavily on the woman. It is worth noting that all of the
major cases dealing with reasonable accommodation of infertility treatment
and coverage of infertility treatment have been brought by female
plaintiffs.216
Moving from the patient's perspective to a societal one, infertility is
still considered a “woman’s problem” by many.217 As the sponsor of a
recent public opinion poll regarding infertility noted, “women are feeling
the brunt of responsibility when it comes to infertility, even though our
research shows a public awareness about the male’s role in conception
problems.”218 Even the Merck Manual, one of the most influential and
widely-used medical reference texts, lists infertility under “Women’s
Health Issues.”219
The resistance to coverage of infertility treatment can be seen as part of
a larger pattern of resistance to coverage of treatments or conditions
associated with sex or sexuality. Past and present debates over coverage of
pregnancy, prescription contraception, and (to a lesser extent) Viagra, serve
as a few examples. However, in the case of infertility treatment, the
resistance to coverage appears profoundly gendered. As Professor Lisa
Ikemoto has written, one popular narrative of infertility is female
selfishness. Infertility is seen as the price women must pay for delaying
motherhood for a career, for enjoying sexual freedom, or for exercising
control over the reproductive process.220
While there is no doubt that infertility affects men, this suggests that
infertility is still considered a “woman’s problem,” and lends support to the
concept that exclusion of treatment for infertility can be seen as an issue of
gender equality that should be cognizable under Title VII.
————
216. See, e.g., Saks II, 316 F.3d at 337; Pacourek, 916 F. Supp. at 797; Erickson, 911
F. Supp. at 316; Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 240; Krauel, 915 F. Supp. at 102.
217. Gilbert, supra note 28, at 1 (noting that infertility is “stereotypically thought of as
a female problem”).
218. Sigma-Tau Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Gallup Survey Shows
Communications/Perception Barriers Between Men and Women When Discussing Infertility
(May 26, 1999), available at
http://www.gobleedit.com/sigmatau/proxeed/consumer/gendergap.html (last visited Apr. 9,
2005)
219. THE MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION - SECOND HOME EDITION,
available at http://www.merck.com/mmhe/sec22.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2005).
220. Lisa C. Ikemoto, The In/fertile, the Too Fertile, and the Dysfertile, 47 HASTINGS
L. J. 1007, 1042-44 (1996). Race and class also play a role, as the “infertile” are defined as
white, married, middle-class women who are less deserving of sympathy. Id. at 1009.

B. INFERTILITY IS NOT A “LIFESTYLE CHOICE”
After receiving the insurance plan’s decision to deny coverage, Jane
realizes that she cannot afford to pursue uncovered treatments. She
experiences feelings of rage, grief and depression at the loss of a chance to
conceive, deliver and raise a child. A well-meaning co-worker attempts to
comfort her by saying that many young women today choose not to have
children.
Some have argued that coverage of treatment to enable men and
women to conceive, deliver and raise a child is not essential to a health care
plan because reproduction is a choice. In the words of one commentator,
“reproduction is a bodily function, but it is one the exercise of which is
purely optional – a lifestyle choice.”221 Indeed, in rejecting reproduction as
a major life activity, the lower court in Krauel characterized reproduction
in these terms, noting that “[s]ome people choose not to have children, but
all people care for themselves, perform manual tasks, walk, see, hear,
speak, breathe, learn, and work, unless a handicap or illness prevents them
from doing so.”222
While is it true that some people choose not to have children, the desire
to have children is pervasive in our society.223 One widely-cited study
found that only two percent of married women are childless by choice.224
Moreover, the loss of the chance to conceive, deliver and raise a child due
to the disease of infertility is a real and devastating loss. As the court in
Pacourek recognized:
Many, if not most, people would consider having a child to
be one of life's most significant moments and greatest
achievements, and the inability to do so, one of life's greatest
disappointments. Since time immemorial, people have
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procreated, not as a lifestyle choice, but as an integral part of
life.225
The intense desire to conceive, carry, birth and raise a child is also
evident from the plaintiffs’ vigorous pursuit of treatment and coverage of
treatment in cases like Erickson v. Board of Governors, Zatarain, Krauel,
Pacourek and Saks.
Moreover, similar arguments could be made for sexual functioning, as
a certain percentage of people throughout the ages and across cultures have
chosen to abstain from sexual activity.226 Therefore, medical treatments
aimed at restoring sexual function could be viewed as non-essential
because sexual activity is simply a “lifestyle choice.” Interestingly, this
argument was not widely raised with respect to Viagra, a drug developed
for male sexual dysfunction.227 Instead, when Viagra was introduced in
1998, insurance companies “responded enthusiastically by willingly
covering the prescriptions, at least in part,”228 and reports estimated that
about half of the men taking Viagra received some form of insurance
reimbursement.229 The outrage over the perceived inequity of employer
health plan coverage of Viagra was a strong motivating factor in the
movement for coverage of prescription contraceptives exemplified by
Erickson.230 The sense of outrage may be heightened by a recent study
indicating that Viagra is increasingly prescribed to younger men without
markers for erectile dysfunction.231
————
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The characterization of childbearing as a lifestyle choice also resonates
with the pernicious image of the woman who “chooses” career and sex
over motherhood described previously. As the Supreme Court recognized
in Bragdon, “[i]n the end, the disability definition does not turn on personal
choice.”232 Although the Court made this statement in the context of the
plaintiff’s choice to run the risks of reproduction – transmission of HIV to
partner and child, in that case – it resonates here, as well. In fact, unlike in
Bragdon, where the desire to reproduce was not related to the activity at
issue in the case (being treated in a dentist’s office), in cases like Saks there
is a tight link between the desire to reproduce and the underlying claim
(seeking coverage of treatment to allow reproduction).
C. THE COST OF COMPREHENSIVE COVERAGE IS OVERSTATED
After receiving the insurance plan’s decision to deny coverage, Jane
speaks with the Human Resources representative at her workplace. He
tells her that their employer simply can’t afford to cover the excluded
treatments, and that including expensive treatments like in vitro
fertilization would dramatically increase the premiums for everyone in the
group.
Employers and insurers have argued that increased coverage of
treatments for infertility, in particular IVF, will dramatically increase health
care costs and health insurance premiums: “[e]choing the traditional
defense by the insurance industry against coverage mandates of all sorts,
they argue that requiring employers to cover infertility treatment will force
some employers to eliminate health benefits entirely and increase the
already considerable number of uninsured Americans.” 233
This argument is unconvincing because there is evidence that the cost
of including comprehensive coverage of infertility treatment is overstated.
For example, one study examined all IVF treatments performed in the
United States during 1995, and projected that coverage of those treatments
would increase group premiums by $3.14 per employee per year.234 Other
studies have reported similar figures.235 Notably, a study examining
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utilization rates in Massachusetts, a state with mandated comprehensive
coverage of infertility treatments, estimated the cost of such additional
comprehensive coverage as $2.49 per insured per year.236 These studies
suggest that the cost of comprehensive infertility coverage is comparable to
the cost of covering full contraceptive benefits.237
This argument is also unconvincing because comprehensive coverage
does not necessarily mean unlimited coverage. Because the devastating
emotional impact of infertility may lead to unreasonable expectations on
the part of the person or couple seeking treatment, some have suggested
external controls which give priority to people with better chances for
success based on medical criteria, limit the number of cycles covered,
direct people to the facilities with the highest success rates based on clear
and consistent data, or limit the number of embryos that can be transferred
at a time to reduce high-risk, high-cost multiple births.238 In addition,
insurers could employ traditional methods of reducing the cost of coverage,
such as negotiating discounts with providers, or charging higher copayments for demonstrably more expensive procedures.239
In sum, although the data is not conclusive, the available evidence
suggests that the cost argument is exaggerated. This does not suggest that
coverage decisions should necessarily be made on the basis of costeffectiveness alone. 240 Indeed, the emotional, medical and social impact of
infertility, particularly on women, raises issues of equity and prioritization
that should also be considered. Nonetheless, given the popularity and
power of the cost argument, its relative lack of support certainly bears
closer scrutiny.
D. COMPREHENSIVE COVERAGE MAY LEAD TO A BETTER AND
MORE COST-EFFECTIVE TREATMENT
Jane sees a new specialist and discovers that she has blocked fallopian
tubes. Her doctor explains that he can either attempt to repair the damage
to her fallopian tubes through one or more rounds of surgery, or he can
————
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bypass the damaged area with IVF. The surgeries are covered under her
employer’s health plan, but IVF is not. Jane opts for tubal repair surgery.
Two years and several surgeries later, she is still unable to conceive.
The pattern of exclusions in plans such as the one in Saks may lead to
inefficient, wasteful and needlessly invasive treatment of infertility.
Covering certain medications and procedures can lead patients to rely on
the covered or less expensive treatments even though they may not be the
most effective. 241 For example, a patient with a plan that excludes IVF but
not intrauterine insemination may opt to undergo the latter even though it is
not effective for her particular infertility problem.242
Choosing treatment options based on coverage alone may also be
significantly more expensive. For example, patients in a situation similar
to Jane’s have undergone repeated attempts at tubal repair surgery – a
procedure that “can be twice as expensive as one attempt at IVF, is more
invasive and is less effective for some patients.” 243 Interestingly, “[s]tudies
show that tubal surgeries drop by 50 percent when [assisted reproductive
technologies such as IVF] are covered by insurance.”244
There are human costs, as well. Surgery also requires significant
recovery time, and a period of up to two years before success can be
measured.245 In contrast, IVF can be performed on an outpatient basis, and
success can be evaluated within two weeks.246 In addition, one study
suggests that women who undergo infertility-related surgery reported
significantly higher levels of depression than women who did not undergo
surgery.247
Overall, the evidence suggests that comprehensive coverage of
treatments for infertility “can act to reduce incentives to seek inappropriate,
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and expensive, treatment.”248 In contrast, lack of comprehensive coverage
for infertility treatments may lead patients to choose an inefficient,
invasive, and potentially more expensive course of treatment.249 Decisions
that uphold selective exclusions, such as Saks, could make this bad
situation even worse.250
CONCLUSION
In the context of employer health plans generally, the protections of
afforded by civil rights laws such as Title VII and the ADA are important
but limited, and state law mandates requiring coverage of certain conditions
or treatments are unlikely to lead to uniform results because of ERISA
preemption. In the case of employer plan coverage of infertility treatment,
a seemingly reachable goal after Bragdon, Saks seems to have aggravated
an already bad situation. Given the rising cost of health care coverage, it is
likely that the exclusion of coverage for treatment of infertility under
employer plans will continue to be an issue. Although Title VII offers
advantages over the ADA for purposes of challenging the exclusion of
infertility treatment, employers and health plans can continue to expect the
types of challenges outlined in this Article to the exclusion of coverage for
infertility treatment under both Title VII and the ADA.
In addition to factual and doctrinal support for claims under Title VII
and the ADA for equitable and non-discriminatory treatment, there are
strong public policy arguments supporting comprehensive coverage of
treatments for infertility. Infertility is still seen as a “woman's issue” and
the failure to conceive, carry and deliver a child cannot be characterized as
“lifestyle choice.” Moreover, there is evidence that the costs of
comprehensive coverage for treatment of infertility are overstated, and that
comprehensive coverage of treatment for infertility could lead to better,
more humane, and more cost-effective treatment.
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In their influential article, “The Emergence and Transformation of
Disputes: Naming, Blaming and Claiming…,” William L.F. Felstiner,
Richard L. Abel and Austin Sarat observed that “[t]he individual’s sense of
entitlement to enjoy certain experiences and be free from others is a
function of the prevailing ideology, of which law is simply a
component.”251 Legal challenges in particular can be a “highly effective
way of transforming ideology to create a sense of entitlement.”252 Many
workers and their families affected by the disease of infertility are
struggling to receive treatment in the absence of adequate insurance
coverage. Bolstered by public policy arguments, legal challenges such as
those outlined in this Article can support the transformation of their
struggle from a cruel twist of personal fate into a cognizable, legitimate and
successful civil rights claim.
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